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Why Modern Evidence Law Lacks Credibility
DANIEL D. BLINKA†
You should use common sense in weighing the evidence and
consider the evidence in light of your own observations in life.1
[T]he system may work best when explained least.2

INTRODUCTION
The modern adversarial trial is at a crossroads.
Curiously, it seems that trials, long a mainstay of popular
culture, are better thought of by the general public than
they are among legal professionals. The public embraces
trials both real and fictional through a variety of media.3
The legal profession is less sanguine. “Alternative” dispute
resolution is ever so fashionable and the “vanishing trial” is
bid good riddance as unreliable if not capricious.4
† Professor of Law, Marquette Law School. This Article was written with the
support of a summer research grant, for which I thank Dean Joseph D. Kearney.
It also profited from a vetting by Patricia Cervenka, Michael O’Hear, Chad
Oldfather, David Papke, Paul Secunda, and Andrea Schneider.
1. THE COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT, FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 1.11
(2009), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_Instr/7th_civ_instruc_2009.
pdf [hereinafter SEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
2. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 481 n.18 (1948) (Jackson, J.).
3. See ROBERT A. FERGUSON, THE TRIAL IN AMERICAN LIFE 267-68 (2007). One
distinguished authority asserts that the modern adversary trial is “now part of
global popular culture.” MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 1 (1997).
Jury trials have captured the public’s attention since the seventeenth century.
See John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 263, 267-72 (1978).
4. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459
(2004). Although clients must approve settlements, including plea bargains in
criminal cases, lawyers heavily influence the decision. See Symposium, Dispute
Resolution in Criminal Law, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 1-162, 370 (2007). For a
thoughtful weighing of trials and plea bargains, see Michael M. O’Hear, What’s
Good About Trials?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 209 (2007),
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2007/OHear.pdf. For criticisms of the
reliability of a trial, see, for example, Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts,
Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 449-
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One’s confidence in trials largely turns on how well they
are believed to reveal the historical truth of “what
happened.”5 And this is largely a function of witness
credibility: Whom do we believe and why? Unsettling to
some while a comfort to others, credibility is deliberately
relegated to the amorphous realm of lay common sense and
life experience. Evidence law provides no independent,
meaningful standard of determining the credibility of lay
witnesses.6 Neither does religion nor science. Rather, the
jury’s life experience and “common sense” are thought
sufficient or, more precisely, the only viable alternative.7
66 (2004), who argues that appellate courts may have more “competence” in
fact-finding than juries; and Gary L. Wells & Lisa E. Hasel, Eyewitness
Identification: Issues in Common Knowledge and Generalization, in BEYOND
COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 159, 164 (Eugene
Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008).
5. See FED. R. EVID. 102; 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6092, at 595 (2d ed. 2007) (“[There are] two
crucial assumptions about the process of proof at trial. First, it assumes that
expanding the opportunities of the advocates to present their competing
versions of the facts usually will promote the truth. Second, it assumes the trier
of fact usually has the ability to consider these competing versions and give the
evidence its proper weight.”); H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the
Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 777 (1993)
(noting that trials are how we “discover the historical truth”).
6. In contrast to lay testimony, concerns about the reliability of expert
testimony triggered radical doctrinal revisions which deputized trial judges as
“gatekeepers” who are to ensure that expert opinions are based only on reliable
methods, tests, and theories. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 579 (1993). Rule 702 was revised to reflect the Daubert line of cases in
2000. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note (amended 2000). For the
insight that Daubert itself may be unreliable as applied by courts, see Robert P.
Mosteller, Finding the Golden Mean with Daubert: An Elusive, Perhaps
Impossible Goal, 52 VILL. L. REV. 723 (2007).
7. Religion is foreclosed by Rule 610, subject to the oath or affirmation
requirement of Rule 603. FED. R. EVID. 603, 610; see also 1 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 46 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) [hereinafter MCCORMICK].
Evidence law is duly skeptical when science stakes claim to truth-telling
proficiency, as best illustrated by the chilly reception of polygraph evidence. See
MCCORMICK, supra, § 206, at 871 (“[There is] widespread and strongly rooted
reluctance to permit the introduction of polygraph evidence.”). The same chill
extends to “psychoanalytically trained experts” who claim a “special faculty” to
“discern the historical truth.” Marianne Wesson, Historical Truth, Narrative
Truth, and Expert Testimony, 60 WASH. L. REV. 331, 333 (1985). For the
development of common sense reasoning in law, see infra text accompanying
notes 37-49.
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This Article considers the central, yet largely
unexplored, role played by popular thought and culture in
both the doctrine governing impeachment law generally and
the determination of witness credibility in trials. Lurking in
the background is the ever-present tension among legal
rules and policy, the insights of modern psychology, and the
community’s common sense.8
Popular assumptions about witness credibility strike
many critics as naïve and invalid, yet these very
assumptions form the core of the law of evidence and
support the trial’s legitimacy.9 More precisely, evidence law
invokes four “testimonial assumptions” whenever a
witness’s testimony is believed accurate, and not a mistake
or a lie: (1) the witness accurately perceived the event
through her five senses; (2) she now accurately recalls those
perceptions when testifying; (3) her words (testimony)
accurately describe her memories; and (4) she is sincerely
recounting those memories (and not lying).10 While the
general public finds these assumptions familiar and
reliable—the very essence of “common sense”—the trial’s
critics are understandably skeptical in light of evidence
law’s wholesale abdication of credibility to popular
thought.11

8. My prime interest here is on the relationship between evidence law and
popular thinking on credibility, which largely forms the law’s epistemological
foundation, not the role for modern psychology. For a discussion of the
fascinating yet grossly understudied subject of the jury’s “common knowledge,”
see John H. Mansfield, Jury Notice, 74 GEO. L.J. 395, 397-400 (1985), discussing
considerations rooted in cost, fair notice, reliability, and political entitlement.
Mansfield’s focus is on factual inferences related to the merits, not on how juries
evaluate credibility.
9. See Wells & Hasel, supra note 4, at 164.
10. For convenience, the term “testimonial assumptions” will be used to
describe the social and cultural implications of these four determinations. 27
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6092, at 593. Labeling them as “assumptions”
usefully underscores our inability to articulate what seems to be an intuitive
inference. See 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5162, at 11-12 (1978) (discussing jury trials and
“khadi justice” where decisions depend more on shared culture and intuition
than “logical analysis”). The assumptions are more extensively discussed at
infra text accompanying notes 95-108.
11. See Mason Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of
Witnesses, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 239, 239 (1967) (“[Modern evidence law permits]
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Why the neglect? Evidence law is largely barren of
theory generally, and credibility is no exception.12
Impeachment law regulates various techniques for probing
credibility at trial, yet provides no measure apart from
popular beliefs. Most impeachment rules sprouted as ad hoc
responses to perceived abuses by lawyers in the nineteenth
century, not from some reified theory of proof.13 Credibility
is deliberately entrusted to popular understanding; hence,
the epistemology of evidence law is also rooted in common
everyday beliefs that have not been fully analyzed by courts
or academics. Although the eminent evidence scholar Mason
Ladd once called credibility the “lawyer’s problem,” it is
nonetheless a problem that a lay jury is ultimately expected
to solve at trial drawing from its own experiences, insights,
and beliefs.14 One cannot rethink witness credibility without
altering fundamental features of the trial.
more evidence . . . but it does not answer the question of whether a witness is
mistaken or intentionally falsifying.”).
12. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 248
(2003) (characterizing evidence law at the end of the eighteenth century as
“undertheorized”); DAMASKA, supra note 3, at 11 (“[C]ommon law evidentiary
doctrine evolved ad hoc, cobbled up over time from judicial rulings in individual
cases.”).
13. See LANGBEIN, supra note 12, at 253-54, 271, 296, 299-300. “[R]eliance on
cross-examination,” observes Langbein, “was at most an article of faith. Crossexamination was a blunt instrument, a hit-or-miss safeguard against the truthbending and truth-concealing effects of placing partisans in charge of the
production and presentation of the evidence.” Id. at 270. Evidence law has
vainly struggled to identify some overarching organizational principle that
might explain its form and function. Is its prime mission to control slovenly
thought by lay jurors? Or do its rules embody instead a preference for the “best
evidence” available, a rationale that explains some but not all major doctrines?
Other scholars, closer to the mark, point to a blinding fear of witness perjury.
See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesis
as to the Logical Structure of Evidence Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1069, 1070-71
(1992) (surveying various explanatory theories).
14. Ladd, supra note 11, at 261. Uviller worried that the jury was not up to
the task.
I am led by my investigations to serious doubt concerning the ability of
a trial jury to perform the central task assigned to them: to assess
credibility. And I must add, insofar as I can determine, the laws of
evidence and the contribution of the trial courts in interpreting and
applying the laws do little to enhance my confidence.
Uviller, supra note 5, at 778.
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This Article develops several themes. First, the
testimonial assumptions recognized by evidence law are
products of mainstream thought and culture, an
epistemology founded upon lay common sense and popular
ideas about how people perceive, remember, and describe
events as well as their sincerity. Second, the legitimacy of
the modern trial depends upon this correspondence between
popular (lay) thought and evidence doctrine, yet that
correspondence is inadequately understood at present.
Third, evidence law is bereft of any systematic approach to
determining credibility. Rather, impeachment doctrine
consists of ad hoc techniques that lawyers use at their
discretion, the assumption being that lawyers are
sufficiently adroit, knowledgeable, and experienced to draw
out the strengths and weaknesses related to the testimonial
assumptions (credibility).
Set against the modern trial are several notable threats.
First, proof that rejects or contradicts the common law
testimonial assumptions, particularly social scientific or
psychological evidence directed at popular “misconceptions,”
effectively diminishes the jury’s role in fact finding and
threatens the trial’s legitimacy.15 More urgent, evidence law
assumes that its testimonial assumptions as well as the
rules governing credibility are consonant with current
popular thought despite their nineteenth-century origins. A
critical issue, largely unexplored, is the extent to which the
popular beliefs that spurred the origins of evidence rules in
the nineteenth century remain viable today. Put differently,
does evidence law still reflect popular thinking about
credibility? Second, trial lawyers with insufficient skill to
use common law modes of impeachment fail to present the
fact finder with the information popularly deemed
necessary to determine credibility. Third, the “vanishing
trial” risks relegating the trial jury to history’s museum of
curiosities while breeding a generation of lawyers lacking
fundamental trial skills and adept only at settlement.16
This Article assesses the testimonial assumptions in
light of the law governing the impeachment and
15. See infra text accompanying notes 154-61.
16. The effect is not confined to trials. The summary judgment process rests
on the evaluation of “admissible” evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Bradley S.
Shannon, Responding to Summary Judgment, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 815 (2008).
Hence, flawed evidence doctrine also warps summary judgment determinations.

2010]

MODERN EVIDENCE CREDIBILITY

363

“rehabilitation”
of
witnesses.
Evidence
law
is
understandably reluctant to substitute its common sense
underpinnings for the infirmities of modern psychology.
Nonetheless, it should strive to better understand its roots
in mainstream thought and popular culture if only to better
appreciate where and how cultural changes, and
psychology’s
insights,
might
assist
credibility
determinations without undermining the trial’s legitimacy.17
The Article opens by assessing credibility’s indifferent
and incomplete treatment under the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE). While it made several significant doctrinal
improvements, the FRE’s glaring omissions reflected the
drafters’ basic contentment with the common law’s
approach to credibility.
Section II provides a brief history of evidence law’s
nineteenth-century
common
law
development.
Impeachment rules originated as ad hoc limitations on
excessive cross-examination tactics that seemed unfair or
overly demeaning. Trial lawyers were far more concerned
with blasting their opponent’s evidence than pursuing the
“truth” that the modern trial purports to be looking for.18
The ad hoc emergence of impeachment rules meant that
they were neither systematic nor necessarily coherent.
Moreover, in shaping the meager doctrine related to
credibility, the common law drew from prevailing
nineteenth-century “common sense” thinking, a school of
thought that dominated both intellectual and popular
thought. Section II closes with two remarkable episodes
from the early twentieth-century in which modern
17. That the roots of evidence law and the trial process are embedded in the
community’s “common sense” is nicely captured in an excellent collection of
essays bearing the apt title, BEYOND COMMON SENSE, supra note 4. Of course
trials should not be shackled to popular thought, yet we should not be
embarrassed by it either. The debt should be recognized and its value
appreciated so that rules and practices can be effectively scrutinized. Moreover,
past shifts in popular thought have dramatically affected the assumptions along
with evidence rules, most notably the preclusion of evidence of a person’s
religious beliefs to prove his truthfulness. See infra text accompanying note 19.
18. See Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence
Scholarship, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 996-97 (1994) (“[Many evidence scholars
accept] optimistic rationalism, that is, the belief that the overarching function of
evidence law is to maximize the (already fairly high) probability that factfinders
in our adjudicatory system will accurately determine objective historical
truth.”).
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psychology unsuccessfully sought to displace popular
knowledge (common sense) in the courtroom. Both instances
involved seminal figures in modern evidence law (Wigmore
and Hutchins).
Section III considers in some detail the four testimonial
assumptions—perception,
memory,
narration,
and
sincerity—that provide the epistemological bedrock for the
common law of credibility. Although modern psychology has
battered the testimonial assumptions and many
impeachment practices, the equally critical question is
whether they remain consonant with today’s popular
thinking. The tension pits the trial’s legitimacy against
concerns about its reliability.
Section IV assesses how well the different modes of
impeachment
test
these
testimonial
assumptions,
particularly how effectively they expose the mistaken
witness as well as the liar. Modern rules, for example, have
abandoned religious beliefs as a measure of a witness’s
sincerity yet remain freighted with other nineteenthcentury cultural baggage, such as the (amorphous)
assumption of “truthful character.”19 Such quaintly
Victorian notions are of little use in evaluating credibility in
today’s courtroom while carrying huge potential for unfair
prejudice.
Finally, Section V argues for changes that demand trial
judges play a more active role in the proof process,
particularly to assure that juries are provided with
information critical to assessing the accuracy of lay
testimony. Both perjury and mistaken testimony are
“wrong” and distort fact finding, yet present rules and
procedures are more oriented toward exposing the liar than
the innocently mistaken witness. This article proposes
several fundamental changes in both trial practice and
evidence law that balance the equation yet fall within the
framework of the common law’s testimonial assumptions.

19. See infra text accompanying notes 245-57. Religious tests are excluded by
FED. R. EVID. 610. Truthful character remains viable despite confusion and
uncertainty over both the concept and the rules implementing it. See FED. R.
EVID. 608, 609.
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I. CREDIBILITY AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
One expecting to find a comprehensive, cogent approach
to credibility in the FRE will be greatly disappointed.
Instead one finds a fragmented treatment of impeachment
law generally and no attempt to elucidate credibility despite
its centrality at trial. Why? As we will see, the FRE largely
deferred to the common law of evidence, which treated
credibility as a feature of the community’s common
knowledge that trial lawyers would probe using ad hoc rules
employed at their discretion.
Although the FRE never purported to be a
comprehensive evidence code, it contains some troubling
omissions nonetheless. For starters, there are no definitions
of critical terms such as “evidence” or “witness.”20 Moreover,
the FRE largely retained the common law’s rules and
practices governing impeachment and rehabilitation, yet
their treatment is incomplete and scattershot.21 The
common law recognized five principal methods of
impeachment:
 Defects in the witness’s testimonial capacity.
 A witness’s bias or interest.
 A witness’s (poor) character for truthfulness,
including prior criminal convictions.
 Prior statements that are inconsistent with the
witness’s testimony.
 Contradiction of the witness by other witness on
material facts.22
The “dozing drafters,” however, addressed only two of the
five, and even then left some loose ends.23

20. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5163.
21. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 33, at 147.
22. For a general discussion of the five modes under the FRE and common
law, see id. § 33. See infra text accompanying notes 115-230 for a fuller
discussion of each mode and how it purportedly relates to credibility.
23. Uviller, supra note 5, at 797-98; see also FED. R. EVID. 607, 608; 2
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN, & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 607.02[6] (9th ed. 2006) (“Although the Federal Rules of
Evidence contain a number of Rules that dictate how witnesses may be
impeached and restrict certain forms of impeachment, . . . there is no serious
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The “dozing drafters” did a commendable job in some
respects. Rule 607 obliterated the common law’s hoary ban
against impeaching one’s own witness.24 Rule 608 took up
the knotty issues governing when a witness’s character for
truthfulness could be attacked or rehabilitated, including
the use of specific instances of untruthful conduct.25 Two
other rules addressed peculiar problems involving character
evidence. Rule 609 governs when prior criminal convictions
may be used to impeach a witness’s truthful character while
Rule 610 provides that a witness’s religious beliefs may not
be used to support or to attack her truthful character.26
Finally, Rule 613 regulates the use of prior inconsistent
statements to impeach a witness’s trial testimony both on
cross-examination and through extrinsic evidence (other
witnesses).27 Nonetheless, aside from addressing character
evidence and prior inconsistent statements, the FRE were
strangely silent about all else.
Especially mysterious was the complete omission of the
two most significant methods of common law impeachment:
defects in testimonial capacity and bias. The common law
prized both methods, deeming them “non-collateral” issues
which thereby accorded lawyers wide latitude on crossexamination and in using extrinsic evidence (other
witnesses) to prove up the impeaching fact.28 So glaring was
their omission that the Supreme Court later held that,
despite the absence of specific rules, impeachment by bias
or interest inhered in the fundamentals of credibility and
relevancy.29

attempt in the Rules to specifically treat all traditional methods of impeaching a
witness.”).
24. FED. R. EVID. 607.
25. FED. R. EVID. 608. The original rule, though, was hardly a model of clarity
and was revised in 2003. See 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6111, at 1 (Supp. 2d ed. 2009)
(describing how the amendment clarified that the rule excludes extrinsic
evidence only when it is offered solely to attack a witness’s truthful character).
26. FED. R. EVID. 609, 610.
27. FED. R. EVID. 613.
28. See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6095, at 627-34 (bias); § 6097, at
674-76 (testimonial capacity).
29. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
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Courts have given similar treatment to evidence
regarding defects in a witness’s testimonial capacity. Rule
601 had mostly obliterated the remaining vestiges of
competency rules, broadly declaring all persons competent
to testify regardless of age, gender, etc.30 Thus, a mentally
impaired witness would not be screened for competency;
defects in her testimonial capacity would run only to her
credibility and the weight of the testimony. Yet no rule
addressed the scope of such impeachment or the order of
proof. Faced with this lacuna, the courts decisively filled the
gap by explicitly recognizing the continuing vitality of this
common law mode of impeachment.31
Why the omissions? It is unlikely that the “dozing
drafters” overlooked them.32 A better answer looks at the
FRE as a conversation with the common law of evidence
that brought clarity and change where deemed necessary
but otherwise left the common law intact.33 Character
evidence, for example, unfortunately reflects much of the
“grotesque structure” of the common law in Rules 404 and
405 with relatively minor changes.34 The character
impeachment rules, Rules 608 and 609, fell in line.35 The
character rules, then, pulled together a complex body of
doctrine that had been scattered among many cases. By
contrast, impeachment by bias and defects in testimonial
capacity seemed simple, well-settled, and straightforward.
Drafting rules might have upset or shattered the perceived
consensus.36
The understanding regarding impeachment by bias and
defects in testimonial capacity was part of a larger
consensus that relegated credibility to the realm of common
30. FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee note.
31. See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6097, at 672-73.
32. See 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §§ 5006-5007 (2d ed. 2005).
33. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 50 (“With this state of unanimity confronting the
drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we think it unlikely that they
intended to scuttle entirely the evidentiary availability of cross-examination for
bias.”).
34. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948); see 22 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5232, at 340.
35. FED. R. EVID. 608, 609.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 122-26, 141-42.
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knowledge. The consensus also conferred wide latitude on
trial lawyers to determine how best to expose the strengths
and weaknesses of witnesses. Put differently, the rules do
not demand that lawyers take any particular steps to
support or attack witnesses’ credibility. It is assumed that
the nature of the adversarial process provides the necessary
inducement and that juries are fully capable of evaluating
the information provided.
II. CREDIBILITY, COMMON SENSE, AND THE COMMON LAW:
A BRIEF HISTORY
How is it that the common law relegated credibility to
the community’s general knowledge? The answer largely
rests in the historical development of the modern adversary
trial. Although that history is beyond our scope, several
points are germane to our understanding of credibility.
The modern trial is the product of the nineteenth
century. Before then trials were exceedingly brief and
featured little of the procedural complexity we find today.
The old-style criminal trial, for example, often lasted no
more than minutes, the defendant was seldom represented
by counsel, and few rules regulated evidence. 37 In many
respects it featured the defendant’s character as a central
issue: one’s reputation and standing mattered as much as
what had happened. Rhetoric aside, “truth” was not the
prize.38 Nor were juries obligated to follow a judge’s
instructions or confined to the “evidence” in any technical
sense.39 Formal evidence rules, particularly those regulating
impeachment, emerged only in the late eighteenth century
along with the increased reliance on trial counsel to present
and contest evidence.40 Trial lawyers, though, were less
concerned with abstract “truth” than in testing their
opponent’s evidence (and winning). Increasingly, courts
fashioned evidence rules aimed at constraining zealous
37. J. M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660-1800, at 356-57,
363, 376 (1986); LANGBEIN, supra note 12, at 16, 178-79.
38. See LANGBEIN, supra note 12, at 307.
39. See id. at 217. I have elaborated upon this point and the old-style trial
generally elsewhere. See Daniel D. Blinka, “This Germ of Rottedness:” Federal
Trials in the New Republic, 1789-1807, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 135 (2003).
40. LANGBEIN, supra note 12, at 178-80; ALLYSON N. MAY, THE BAR
OLD BAILEY, 1750-1850, at 197-201 (2003).

AND THE
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advocacy, particularly cross-examination, yet these rules too
became “levers” in the hands of lawyers.41 Eventually, the
pursuit of “justice” paralleled the search for truth as the
legal profession rationalized the trial’s rather strained
claims to find the truth through an adversarial contest.42
Some saw salvation in evidence rules that might serve
as a science of proof. Simon Greenleaf, one of Harvard Law
School’s founding faculty members and the author of the
first American treatise on evidence law in 1842, placed more
store in the rules than in trials.43 Although Greenleaf’s
treatise addressed the burgeoning number of exclusionary
rules that governed hearsay and witness examination, for
example, it also portrayed the law of evidence as itself a
science of proof, a view that reflected more Greenleaf’s
aspirations than the reality of the courtroom.44 A devout
evangelical Christian, Greenleaf harmonized his legal and
religious beliefs in an 1846 tract that displayed how
evidence law proved the truth of the New Testament.45 In
brief, Greenleaf meticulously applied the law’s proof
principles in establishing the credibility of the gospel
writers, particularly their sincerity and skills at observing
and recording Jesus’s life and teachings.46
Yet Greenleaf’s central point was not to prove the
gospels’s truth, which all evangelicals knew to be true
anyway, but to demonstrate that credibility determinations
and the discovery of truth generally was the special
province of law and lawyers.47 Greenleaf’s views on evidence
41. LANGBEIN, supra note 12, at 179, 248-51, 310.
42. May, supra note 40, at 233. Langbein lays out the transition from the
older-form of criminal trial, the “accused-speaks” procedure, to the modern
adversary trial. LANGBEIN, supra note 12, at 178-79 (evidence rules); id. at 25354 (the adversary trial).
43. See Daniel D. Blinka, The Roots of the Modern Trial: Greenleaf’s
Testimony to the Harmony of Christianity, Science, and Law in Antebellum
America, 27 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 293, 294 (2007).
44. SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE
ed. 1848).

ON THE

LAW

OF

EVIDENCE 3-4, 123-53 (4th

45. SIMON GREENLEAF, AN EXAMINATION OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE FOUR
EVANGELISTS, BY THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF JUSTICE:
WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE TRIAL OF JESUS, at vii-viii (2d ed. 1847).
46. See Blinka, supra note 43, at 303-06.
47. See id. at 327.
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law and proof fully embraced the school of common sense
philosophy, which dominated scientific thinking while
permeating religious and popular thinking in midnineteenth century America, thus forming the paradigm
shared by most segments of society. Greenleaf explicitly
rested the core principles and doctrines of evidence law on
common-sense thinking to assure both its scientific
acceptability and to guarantee its popular acceptance.48
In sum, there was nothing esoteric about evidence law’s
core assumptions; they were widely shared by scientific
thinkers and the lay public.49 This consensus furthered the
legitimacy of trials, which depended upon lay participation,
lay understanding, and lay acceptance. When modern
psychology emerged in the late nineteenth century, it met
resistance from the legal profession whenever it conflicted
with these core assumptions, as we will see in the next
section. Although some sciences moved beyond common
sense thinking, the latter’s tenets remained deeply set in
evidence law and popular thinking. The legitimacy of trials
seemingly depended upon it.
A. Redux: Wigmore, Hutchins, and Modern Psychology
One looking at the uneasy relationship between the
popular beliefs ensconced in evidence law and the critiques
of modern psychology may benefit from two earlier
collisions. For better or worse, in each encounter the law
triumphed over psychology which tells us something about
both the age and staying power of popular views of
credibility.
The first tale involves Professor Hugo Münsterberg, a
German psychology professor. Münsterberg’s 1907 book, On
the Witness Stand,50 ostentatiously declared that the “new
science” of “applied psychology” would replace the “legal
instinct” and “common sense” of judges, lawyers, and the
“juryman” especially in understanding “the mind of the
witness.”51 Münsterberg, for example, emphasized the
48. See id. at 325-26; see also EVANGELICALS AND SCIENCE IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE (David N. Livingstone, D. G. Hart, & Mark A. Noll eds., 1999).
49. Blinka, supra note 43, at 325.
50. HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND (1908).
51. Id. at 10-11.
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“treachery of human memory” that undercut a witness’s
reliability regardless of her sincere desire to be truthful.52
He recounted the outcome of experiments in German
classrooms where startling events (e.g., a violent
confrontation) were staged for purposes of exploring how
widely, and wildly, the accounts varied when studentwitnesses were later questioned.53 In some instances the
witness’s observations were “defective and illusory.”54 Nor
was certainty of memory correlated with its accuracy.55
Münsterberg harpooned the competence of Anglo-American
evidence law and trials:
The correlations between [sic] attention, recollection, and feeling
of certainty become the more complex the more we carefully study
them. Not only the self-made psychology of the average juryman,
but also the scanty psychological statements which judge and
attorney find in the large compendium on Evidence fall to pieces if
a careful examination approaches the mental facts.56

Münsterberg, thus, sized up American law and found it
sadly wanting in its capacity to determine credibility. And
with no pretense at humility, the German professor
asserted that “experimental psychology” could measure the
differing capacities among people for perception and
recollection “far beyond anything which common sense and
social experience suggest.”57
Into the breach stepped John Henry Wigmore, whose
masterful four-volume Treatise on Evidence first appeared
in 1904-1905 in place of later shop-worn editions of
Greenleaf’s work.58 For the remainder of twentieth century,
Wigmore dominated American evidence law like no other

52. Id. at 44, 48.
53. Id. at 49-50.
54. Id. at 56.
55. Id. at 57-58.
56. Id. at 56.
57. Id. at 63. Münsterberg argued that his “experimental psychology” should
be placed on the same footing as fingerprint analysis and testimony by
“anatomists and physiologists,” which had been accepted by “[m]odern law.” Id.
58. William R. Roalfe, John Henry Wigmore–Scholar and Reformer, 53 J.
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 277, 283 (1962).
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figure.59 Wigmore wasted little time in essentially
destroying Münsterberg’s own credibility and reassuring
the public and the legal profession that the trial system did
not need further assistance from psychology or, for that
matter, German professors.
In a savagely brilliant critique, Wigmore purported to
place Münsterberg on trial for libeling the common law of
evidence.60 The plaintiffs, “Edward Cokestone and others,”
who personified the common law, claimed that defendant
Münsterberg’s On the Witness Stand contained “assertions
erroneous, incorrect, and untrue.”61 The fictitious libel trial
featured just one witness, Münsterberg himself, who pled
truth as his defense.62 Münsterberg’s testimony described
various psychological tests that allegedly measured
differences in perception and memory among people.63 Yet
what rankled plaintiffs (Wigmore) was the German
professor’s charge that the legal profession was both blind
to these issues and incapable of handling them.64
The nub of the plaintiffs’ case questioned whether
Münsterberg’s experimental tests were as well accepted by
“Continental psychologists and jurists” as he suggested, and
whether those methods had such merit “that they could be
actually now used and relied on in trials as being superior
to the methods hitherto in use?”65 As the reader might
suspect, the cross-examination exposed Münsterberg’s
assertions as baseless. The defendant silently conceded that
his experimental methods lacked the “Continental” support
he had suggested.66 The cross-examination also demolished
59. WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES
(1985).

OF
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60. John H. Wigmore, Professor Muensterberg [sic] and the Psychology of
Testimony: Being a Report of the Case of Cokestone v. Muensterberg, 3 ILL. L.
REV. 399 (1909); see also TWINING, supra note 59, at 135-36.
61. Wigmore, supra note 60, at 399. Good lawyer he was, Wigmore’s
pleadings specified the defendant’s numerous libels, including those maligning
the common law’s failures to stay current with modern thinking. Id. at 399-401.
62. Id. at 403.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 403-04.
65. Id. at 405 (emphasis omitted).
66. Id. at 415-16.
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any pretense that psychology improved upon the common
law’s methodology.67
Wigmore’s point was that Münsterberg had grossly
overstated the capacity of modern psychology and vastly
underestimated the common law’s grasp of credibility issues
and its efficacy in addressing them. Indeed, Wigmore hoped
for an “energetic alliance of psychology and law, in the noble
cause of justice.”68 Almost magnanimously, he closed by
vigorously criticizing the legal profession’s obstinacy and
backwardness with respect to forensic sciences.69 Far from
slamming the door to modern psychology, Wigmore
plaintively hoped the day would come when it could provide
more assistance, but clearly the gatekeepers would be the
lawyers themselves (actually Wigmore), not German
psychologists.70
A second tale also involves Wigmore but centers on a
dominant figure in American higher education, Robert
Maynard Hutchins. Appointed to the Yale Law School
faculty after graduating from Yale in 1925, Hutchins
became the school’s dean in 1927 before leaving several
years later to become the president of the University of
Chicago, a position he held until the 1970s.71 An evidence
teacher at Yale, Hutchins co-authored a series of path
breaking articles that applied the latest insights of modern
psychology to evidence law. Hutchins too challenged
Wigmore’s suzerainty, presenting a more significant threat
than Münsterberg’s because it came from within the
American legal academy.72
67. See id. at 416-31.
68. Id. at 432.
69. Id. at 433-34.
70. See TWINING, supra note 59, at 136 (“It might be said that, having
dispatched Muensterberg [sic], [Wigmore] moved in to occupy the field
himself.”).
71. See HARRY S. ASHMORE, UNSEASONABLE TRUTHS: THE LIFE
MAYNARD HUTCHINS 45-56 (1989).

OF

ROBERT

72. In 1929 Wigmore invited Hutchins to “collaborate” on a new edition of
Wigmore’s book, PRINCIPLES OF PROOF. TWINING, supra note 59, at 137. Hutchins
declined citing the labors of learning his new job as president of the University
of Chicago. Id. One suspects that Hutchins’s earlier tweaking of Wigmore and
later skepticism about the admixture of law and psychology made the joint
endeavor unlikely in any event.
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Hutchins insightfully observed that evidence law itself
harbored a psychology of sorts borne of experience and lay
intuition; this “subjective psychology,” though, had devolved
into a “morass.”73 In a 1926 address before the Association of
American Law Schools (AALS), Hutchins asserted that law
should look to the “objective psychologists” to “extricate the
administration of the law” from the doctrinal swamp.74
Failure to do so augured legal doom, as the lawyers would
“abdicate our position as specialists in human behavior,
reaffirm the traditional conservatism of the profession, and
permit the rules of evidence to recede still further from
reality.”75 Along with a psychologist, Hutchins co-authored a
series of seminal law review articles that critiqued various
evidence rules in light of modern psychology.76 Their impact
is attested by the Advisory Committee’s use of the articles
when drafting the FRE over forty years later.77 Even today
the articles are often excerpted and discussed in evidence
text books.78
Hutchins’s articles formed the phalanx of a thinly-veiled
attack against Wigmore, whose “masterly treatise discloses
the mass of conflicting rules, of metaphysical doctrines, of
methods of concealing the truth now sanctioned in our
courts.”79 Less than flattered, Wigmore wrote of his
displeasure to Yale’s president, James R. Angell, churlishly
complaining that Hutchins had relegated him to the
“fossils.”80 Oddly, he analogized Hutchins’ fixation on
73. ASHMORE, supra note 71, at 47.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the
Law of Evidence (pts. 1, 2 & 3), 37 YALE L.J. 1017 (1928), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432
(1928), 77 U. PA. L. REV. 725 (1929).
77. FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(2) advisory committee note (citing Hutchins &
Slesinger, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, supra note 76). The advisory committee
observed that despite Hutchins’s critique that “excitement impairs accuracy of
observations,” the rule “finds support in cases without number.” Id.
78. E.g., RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN
AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 549-550 (6th ed. 2007) (excerpting Hutchins, 28
COLUM. L. REV. 432, supra note 76); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 65 (6th
ed. 2008) (citing Hutchins & Slesinger, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 725, supra note 76).
79. ASHMORE, supra note 71, at 46.
80. Id.
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psychology to the extremist adherents of free-silver in
economics.81 Angell passed Wigmore’s letter on to Hutchins
along with a note, “I get the impression that you must have
stepped on some of his most sensitive corns.”82
Hutchins’ iconoclasm was short lived. In a 1933 address
to the AALS, which was printed in the very first volume of
the University of Chicago Law Review, Hutchins virtually
recanted.83 Almost apologetically, Hutchins regretted that
law schools had reached out to social scientists for answers
to legal problems.84 He credited them with exposing “the
masses of social, political, economic, and psychological data
which lay hidden in the cases.”85 Nonetheless, while “the
social scientists seemed to have a great deal of information,
we could not see and they could not tell us how to use it.”86
He then turned to evidence law:
For example, the law of evidence is obviously full of assumptions
about how people behave. We understood that the psychologists
knew how people behave. We hoped to discover whether an
evidence case was “sound” by finding out whether the decision was
in harmony with psychological doctrine. What we actually
discovered was that psychology had dealt with very few of the
points raised by the law of evidence; and that the basic
psychological problem of the law of evidence, what will affect
juries, and in what way, was one psychology had never touched at
all.87

Hutchins closed with “the hope of some day striking some
mutual sparks” between law and psychology.88 That day
would be far off.
Wigmore had seemingly vanquished Münsterberg in the
first contest, yet he had elided the issue of how well lawyers
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student,
1 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 512 (1934). Interestingly, modern commentators who rely
on the Hutchins & Slesinger articles seldom take up Hutchins’s recantation.
84. Id. at 512.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 513.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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and juries actually assessed credibility. In the second
contest the brilliant Hutchins had reconsidered his own
stance, concluding that legal scholars need not surrender to
psychology, but rather should “formulate legal theory” that
is consonant with what he termed the “rational sciences of
Ethics and Politics.”89 For present purposes, what matters is
Hutchins’s belated recognition that evidence and trials
centered on ideas, values, and institutions that significantly
differed in some respects from scientific psychology. His
assessment that psychology did not hold all the answers,
however, did not imply that evidence law did.
III. CREDIBILITY AND THE TESTIMONIAL ASSUMPTIONS
If the law uneasily eschews modern psychology, it has
been simultaneously reticent to spell out its alternative
vision. At its root, credibility raises three questions about a
witness’s testimony: Is he lying?; Is he (honestly) mistaken?;
Or is he accurate? Modern evidence law is oddly silent
about how we answer these critical questions. Over forty
years ago, Mason Ladd observed that while the modern
trend is toward “letting in more evidence,” the law “does not
answer the question of whether a witness is mistaken or
intentionally falsifying.”90 The case law fixates on legal rules
governing admissibility and the trial judge’s broad
discretion; it focuses on what is put before the jury, not how
the jury may (or should) resolve credibility. The
commentators too are largely quiet about the assumptions
by which we sort testimony as false (lies), mistaken, or
accurate, dwelling instead on particular rules or practices
governing impeachment and rehabilitation. The peculiar
epistemology (or psychology) underlying evidence law is
seldom addressed on its own terms, largely on the
assumption that it is consonant with popular thought.
A. Testimonial Assumptions
Briefly stated, there are four testimonial assumptions
that must be made before testimony may be considered

89. Id. at 517.
90. Ladd, supra note 11, at 239.
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accurate.91 First, the witness accurately perceived the fact.
Second, she has accurately recalled the perception while
testifying. Third, her spoken words at trial (testimony)
accurately describe her memory of the event (narration).
And fourth, she is sincerely (“truthfully”) describing this
memory.
Before discussing how these assumptions play out in
each of the five recognized modes of impeachment, it is
useful to consider generally the common law’s epistemology
because, one assumes, it rests on popular notions about how
people observe, remember, and narrate their experiences—
so called “common knowledge.” Neither the case law nor the
legal commentary is awash in a careful discussion of the
testimonial assumptions.92 For example, the venerable
McCormick’s handbook relegates “credibility” and its
assumptions to a footnote in its chapter on impeachment.93
The reader purportedly understands that credibility turns
on one’s common sense evaluation; thus, the testimonial
assumptions are themselves assumed. And to the extent
that one is uneasy about this brand of epistemology, the
91. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 62, at 308; 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra
note 5, § 6092, at 593 (“Accuracy is a function of the existence or non-existence
of the four ‘testimonial assumptions.’ These are (1) that the witness perceived
the fact, (2) that she accurately recalls her perception, (3) that she truthfully
states her recollection, and (4) that she expresses her testimony in a way that
permits it to be understood by the jury in the manner intended by the witness.”);
22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 10, § 5177, at 143-44.
92. Understandably, the commentators often focus on particular rules,
doctrines, and practices that describe or delimit the lawyer’s examination of the
witness. See, e.g., PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE § 22.01 (2d ed.
2006); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 6.18 (3d
ed. 2009); ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS § 9.02 (2d ed. 2004); 2 SALTZBURG,
MARTIN & CAPRA, supra note 23, § 6.07.02[6].
93. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 33, at 147 n.5, states in part:
Credibility is dependent on the witness’s willingness to tell the truth
and his ability to do so. In turn, his ability to tell the truth as to an
event of which he purports to possess personal knowledge is the
product of his physical and mental capacity, actual employment of the
capacity to perceive, record, and recollect, and his ability to narrate.
Impeachment of a witness may be directed to one or more components
of credibility. Thus the objective being pursued in any given situation
may be to draw into question the accuracy of the witness’s perception,
recordation, recollection, narration, or sincerity.
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basic premises underlying the modern trial are shaken to
their foundation.94
1. The Assumption of Perception. We assume that
human beings perceive external reality through the five
senses: sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Lay
witnesses are required to have personal knowledge of the
facts to which they testify.95 Evidence law effectively
equates “sensory perception with knowledge”:
If experience and science tell us anything, it is that there is a link
between our sensory perception and objective reality. This is, in
fact, the essential epistemological assumption underlying modern
notions of proof and is embodied in Rule 602’s equating sensory
perception with knowledge.96

Absolute certainty is not required. Witnesses may
testify in terms of what they “think” or “believe” or are “sure
of,” even though they are less than one hundred percent
certain.97 Speculation, though, is not acceptable. Witnesses
may not testify, for example, to what another person
“thought” or “knew” since mind reading is not within the
range of the five senses.98 Case law also categorically forbids
one witness from testifying whether another witness is
lying or truthful about a fact.99
This approach to perception is, as we have seen, solidly
rooted in our common experience and popular culture.100 No
94. See Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Repressed and Recovered Memory, in
BEYOND COMMON SENSE, supra note 4, at 177, 190 (“Unfortunately for the legal
system, there is no reliable way to listen to a memory report [in repressed
memory claims] and judge whether it is true or false.”). And unfortunately for
psychologists, this largely explains why they are often excluded as witnesses.
95. FED. R. EVID. 602.
96. See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6022, at 215. Discussing FRE Rule
602, the same authors carefully distinguish observations and sensory
perceptions from “comprehension,” but quickly note that witnesses are
“presumed” to have experiences “common to society.” A child witness or
testimony by a “lunatic” may necessitate more foundation. Id. at 227.
97. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 10, at 49-50; see also 27 WRIGHT & GOLD,
supra note 5, § 6023, at 224 (“[A] relatively minimal level of perception is
required[;]perceptions [that] are sparse or shallow usually [run] to the weight of
the testimony . . . .”).
98. See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6022, at 215-16.
99. See, e.g., Liggett v. People, 135 P.3d 725, 729-32 (Colo. 2006).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
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school of psychology or neurology underwrites these
everyday notions of perception, yet they are readily
embraced in taverns and bowling alleys, as well as
courtrooms and law schools. Rule 602, then, defers to
ordinary lay understanding: when questions surface about
whether a witness has personal knowledge, the judge
determines only whether a reasonable jury could find that
the witness has such knowledge.101 This shared governance
reflects shared assumptions.
2. Assumptions About Memory. If the law equates
personal knowledge with sensory perceptions, memory is
concerned with how that knowledge is retained and
preserved. The assumption is that perceptions are
embedded in our memories, which may be recalled for later
use. Its key elements are that memories are stable and
retrievable. True, some events are completely forgotten or
recalled only with difficulty and in sketchy detail. But this
is normal and to be expected, just as one might not possibly
perceive the whole event in the first place.
Courts and commentators describe memory in terms of
“recollection” or, more revealingly, a “record” of events that
have transpired.102 An analogy is sometimes made to a
“video camera”: the lens capture images which are recorded
by the camera’s memory for later playback when needed.103
While the analogy is useful, the “video camera” view must
be qualified in two respects. First, it is distressingly
mechanical yet also implies a biological process that has yet
to be accepted by science.104 Second, the assumption of
stable, retrievable memories took root long before the
advent of photography or, certainly, digital and video
technology. Its long history and deep embodiment in
popular culture effectively negates concerns that science
101. FED. R. EVID. 602.
102. See 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 601:1, at
322, § 607:1, at 441 (6th ed. 2006) (“record and recollect”); MCCORMICK, supra
note 7, § 33, at 147 n.5, § 62, at 304-05 (listing both “recall” and “record”).
103. See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6011, at 139 (“[M]any scientists
dispute the validity of the video camera theory of memory.”).
104. See id. The same authors assert that “innumerable” factors affect
“narrative, perceptual and recall abilities” which are “hotly debated within the
scientific community . . . .” Id. at 156; see also id. at 592 n.3 (“[F]urther
particularization within the Federal Rules of some aspects of impeachment law
would be a good idea.”).
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has yet to explicate memory’s precise workings. Moreover,
the assumption of stable, retrievable memories is perhaps
the core testimonial assumption: unless one accepts it, the
belief that a trial may function as a search for the truth is
whimsical at best. Indeed, absent the assumption, a great
many institutions and segments of our culture, not the least
of which is history itself, is questionable.105 Yet there are
many respected authorities that assail the assumption of
stable memories, a challenge that threatens the core of trial
evidence.106
In short, we depend on this assumption in ordering our
daily lives. A resolute belief in stable, retrievable memories
is part of our cultural bedrock which also forms the core
assumption of evidence law. We readily recall what we had
for dinner last night yet are not at all alarmed that we
cannot remember what we ate a year ago today. We have a
good feel for memory’s limits.
3. Assuming Narrative Accuracy. A witness’s
testimony consists of her attempt to describe in words what
she remembers having perceived. The assumption is that
witnesses articulate their memories with as much accuracy
as their vocabulary, education, life experiences, and
personality permit. The witness essentially verbalizes to the
jury the memories she recalls.
This assumption of narrative accuracy is also firmly
embedded in popular culture. Our social fabric depends
upon countless daily conversations during which
information is conveyed and exchanged. And despite our
reverence for the written word and recent penchant for
electronic communications, most of this communication is
oral. Discussions of narrative accuracy are usually
overshadowed by concerns relating to perception and
memory, yet narration is the medium by which the witness
transfers her information to the trier of fact. An unheralded,
frequently overlooked feature of the assumption of narrative
accuracy is the primacy of witness testimony in the modern
trial. Witnesses are expected to recount orally their
memories before the jury; the preference is for a “live”
performance. And for the same reason, we generally exclude
105. See generally JOYCE APPLEBY, LYNN HUNT & MARGARET JACOB, TELLING
198-237 (1994).

THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY

106. See infra text accompanying notes 110-11.
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hearsay statements, even those uttered by the very witness,
because they were made other than “while testifying” at the
trial or hearing.107
The difficulties inherent in narration cannot be
gainsaid; this is why good radio play-by-play announcers
are well-paid. Most people shy away from public speaking, a
fear more pronounced when one is placed under oath and
subject to cross-examination before a jury’s close, discerning
gaze. Yet the assumption is that the witness’s words
accurately and meaningfully communicate her personal
knowledge to the trier of fact. The general bar against
leading questions on direct examination rests largely on the
premise that the witness should choose her own words in
describing her memories. By contrast, leading questions on
cross-examination are usually intended to test the witness’s
resolve to describe things one way and not another.108
4. Assuming Sincerity. Finally, it is assumed that the
witness is truthfully recounting what she knows in her
testimony. Here, too, the assumption is part of our social
fabric. People are normally sincere and trustworthy in what
they relate to others. Yet the assumption as usually stated
seems Pollyannaish and politically correct, at least in the
sense that it emphasizes a human proclivity to be accurate
and honest. Usually unstated is our general knowledge that
all people tell lies on occasion. This too is part of the human
condition, a dark fact too well understood to require
demonstration. Perhaps it would be more accurate to
restate the assumption of sincerity along the following lines:
People are sometimes honest and sometimes deceitful, and
we assume that the trier of fact is capable of distinguishing
the one from the other. After all, we encounter deceit, lies,
and distortions on a daily basis, experiences that prepare us
to detect insincerity in sworn testimony. And while our
confidence may be misplaced, we are without scientific or
religious tests that present viable alternatives. In short, we
must “deal with it.”

107. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
108. See FED. R. EVID. 611(c).
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B. Coda: The Testimonial Assumptions, Popular Beliefs,
and Modern Psychology
Although
commentators
observe
that
the
“epistemological basis for modern evidence law . . . is subject
to challenge,”109 there has not been much of a contest
perhaps because this “epistemology” itself remains
enigmatic, underdeveloped, and largely unexplained.
Nonetheless, evidence law’s testimonial assumptions
roughly reflect popular thinking. And from this congruence,
largely assumed, trials gain their legitimacy. If the public
defers to law and lawyers it is generally because there is
such a broad swath of consensus.
To be sure, psychologists and social scientists have
attacked many aspects of the testimonial assumptions.
Those regarding perception and memory have been
particularly lambasted.110 Yet modern psychology is itself
divided among competing approaches that have yet to prove
their worth at trial.111 Unclear is why evidence law should
defer to one or another school of psychology, especially in
the absence of a dominant paradigm that significantly
invalidates the common law’s testimonial assumptions.112
Case law excluding expert psychological testimony as
unhelpful or as lacking reliability under Rule 702 provides
even less reason to make modern psychology the arbiter of
evidence rules themselves.113 To do so would sacrifice the
hard-won legitimacy of the modern trial for the latest trends
109. 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6022, at 216 n.10; see also Anne
Bowen Poulin, Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert Testimony?, 59 FLA. L. REV.
991, 992-93 (2007).
110. See, e.g., Loftus et al., supra note 94, at 178-90. With respect to repressed
memory, the authors discuss the chasm between popular beliefs (i.e. what a jury
might believe) and the “psychological community,” which is more skeptical. Id.
at 189.
111. See id. at 189-90; see also David L. Faigman, The Limits of Science in the
Courtroom, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE, supra note 4, at 304-13.
112. See THOMAS HARDY LEAHEY, A HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 365-76 (1980)
(discussing the “disarray” surrounding cognitive psychology where three
alternative paradigms contend for primacy).
113. In a sense, the Federal Rules of Evidence, through Rule 702, contain a
self-defense mechanism that protects defendants from external threats to their
coherence. For a survey of the issues, see MCCORMICK, supra note 7, §§ 20-26, at
113-26.
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in academic styling. Hutchins’ hope in the 1930s of some
day “striking sparks” between law and psychology has yet to
kindle a flame.114
IV. THE COMMON LAW MODES OF IMPEACHMENT AND THE
TESTIMONIAL ASSUMPTIONS
The common law recognizes five modes of attacking or
supporting credibility: (1) bias or interest; (2) defective
testimonial capacity; (3) the witness’s truthful character; (4)
prior statements; and (5) contradiction.115 These modes are
not doctrinally integrated. Rather, they emerged
haphazardly as curbs on abusive cross-examination and in
no way embody a coherent system of proof determination.116
Their common shortcoming is an obsessive preoccupation
with perjury and concomitant insensitivity to the problem of
mistaken testimony.117 It warrants emphasizing that the
application of any of the five modes is left entirely to the
discretion of trial counsel. The law does not insist upon
their use nor does it impose rigid foundations. Their
application at trial, then, is ad hoc, contingent, and
capricious, depending greatly on the tactical skill, judgment,
and preparation of trial counsel. The five modes are at
bottom techniques born of cross-examination, not analytic
categories,118 as illustrated by a leading case.
In United States v. Abel,119 we see four of the five modes
at work, although the Supreme Court’s decision emphasized
only bias impeachment. Two men, Abel and Ehle, were
charged with robbery. In exchange for a plea deal, Ehle
testified for the prosecution about Abel’s involvement in the
robbery. Abel, however, asserted that he had nothing to do
with the robbery and that Ehle was lying just to get a better
deal for himself. To prove this, the defense called a witness,
114. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
115. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 33, at 147-48.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
117. See Ladd, supra note 11, at 241; Uviller, supra note 5, at 779.
118. Uviller advances a more refined typology that identifies six “species” of
credibility testing that he places among three categories: substantive
(contradiction, inconsistency, and incoherence), motivational (bias, character),
and behavioral (demeanor). Uviller, supra note 5, at 781-87.
119. 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
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Mills, who testified that Ehle had earlier confided to him
that he, Ehle, would falsely implicate Abel in the robbery in
order to get a break from prosecutors. The government
responded by later recalling Ehle to testify that all three
men—Abel, Mills, and Ehle— belonged to a prison gang
that obligated members to lie and commit crimes in order to
protect fellow members.120 Abel thus features the following
impeachment modes: (1) bias (Ehle’s search for a deal and
Mills’ duty to lie on Abel’s behalf); (2) specific instances of
untruthful conduct by a witness (Ehle’s stated intent to lie
about Abel); (3) a prior inconsistent statement (Ehle’s
alleged confession of perjury to Mills was, of course,
inconsistent with his trial testimony implicating Abel); and
(4) contradiction (Mills contradicted Ehle’s testimony
implicating Abel).
The following sections briefly describe each mode of
impeachment and rehabilitation while assessing their
fidelity to the common law testimonial assumptions,
especially their relationship to popular culture and the
community’s understanding of how people observe,
remember, and relate their knowledge. All reflect the
modern trial’s unconditional faith in adversary procedure
and cross-examination, devices better suited for testing the
opponent’s proof than determining historical truth.121 Of
special concern is how well each mode protects against
honest but mistaken testimony as well as perjury.
A. Bias and Interest
A witness’s bias or interest is perhaps the most readily
familiar avenue of impeachment. In everyday life we
constantly assess other people’s interests in myriad
situations, whether buying cars or interviewing job
applicants. When we ask whether someone is “objective” we
are in effect assaying the risk that some bias or interest
may affect the accuracy of what she says. Without
overstating the matter, a person’s interest or disinterest is
inevitably considered in the same reflexive way that we
observe her demeanor.
120. Id. at 47.
121. See LANGBEIN, supra note 12, at 247 (“Contemporaries knew that the
purpose of cross-examination was to win, whether that entailed seeking or
distorting the truth.”); see also id. at 270.
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The law of evidence has long recognized the problem of
bias and interest. Early rules woodenly excluded testimony
by interested witnesses as “incompetent.”122 By the late
eighteenth century, however, the law shifted to permit such
testimony: theoretically, any interest now ran to the
witness’s credibility and the weight of her testimony;
procedurally, the introduction of trial counsel and the
opportunity to cross-examine allayed fears that a witness’s
bias would not be properly exposed to the trier of fact.123
Modern
evidentiary
doctrine
highly
esteems
impeachment by bias, which has constitutional footings as
well.124 A cross-examiner has virtually free rein to explore a
witness’s interest. Multiple questions are routinely
permitted regardless of the answers. Further, counsel is not
bound by the witness’s answers. Extrinsic evidence (i.e.
other witnesses) may be called to prove the bias or interest
of a target witness who denies or minimizes the influence.125
Bias impeachment is so prized that the Supreme Court
122. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 65, at 313-17.
123. Bias impeachment doctrine dimly reflects older, outmoded cultural
assumptions that gave rise to antiquated rules rendering interested persons
incompetent to testify. The fear was that interested persons would succumb to
perjury, a risk compounded by the eighteenth-century British reward and
Crown Witness systems. See generally LANGBEIN, supra note 12, at 209-28
(discussing the problem of accomplice testimony and coerced confessions); see
also id. at 217 (“We see in the Twelve Judges’ opinion [in Atwood and Robbins,
an accomplice-witness case] an indication of how primitive the theoretical basis
of the law of evidence remained as late as 1787. The centrality of competency to
the thinking . . . reflected the world of contemporary civil practice that the
judges mostly inhabited, where the testimonial disqualification of parties and
other witnesses for interest (competency) played such a prominent role in
restricting the receipt of oral evidence at trial.”).
124. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (finding that bias
impeachment inheres in the constitutional right to confrontation); see also
GIANNELLI, supra note 92, § 22.04[A], at 265-66.
125. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 51; see also id. at 52 (“Proof of bias is almost always
relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has
historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the
accuracy and truth of a witness’ testimony. The ‘common law of evidence’
allowed the showing of bias by extrinsic evidence, while requiring the crossexaminer to ‘take the answer of the witness’ with respect to less favored forms of
impeachment.” (citations omitted)). The trial court has discretion to trim the
cross-examination or limit the use of extrinsic evidence as provided by FRE Rule
403. See, e.g., Lewy v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 799 F.2d 1281, 1297-98 (9th Cir.
1986); see also GIANNELLI, supra note 92, § 22.04, at 263-66.
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recognized that it is inherent in the very concept of
“relevant” evidence and permissible despite the absence of a
specific rule.126
Bias and interest are protean, occurring in innumerable
ways and forms across the entire web of human
relationships–social, financial, emotional, and political. A
bias or interest may motivate a lie or induce mistakes, as
the Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Abel:
Bias is a term used in the “common law of evidence” to describe
the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead
the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in
favor of or against a party. Bias may be induced by a witness’ like,
dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness’ self-interest.127

Bias, then, is a familiar product of human nature which
need only pass the minimal threshold of relevancy.128
Bias or interest potentially touches all four testimonial
assumptions. Sincerity is the most obvious. Self-interest or
a relationship with others may lead a witness to “slant” or
“fabricate” testimony.129 These interests may be financial,
emotional, or venal. In criminal cases, accomplices are
frequently tempted to trade testimony for favorable plea
deals.130 Cash rewards may also trigger fabricated
126. E.g., Abel, 469 U.S. at 50-51. Abel discussed FRE Rules 401 and 402,
explaining that “[a] successful showing of bias on the part of a witness would
have a tendency to make the facts to which he testified less probable in the eyes
of the jury than it would be without such testimony.” Id.
127. Id. at 52.
128. See Outley v. City of N.Y., 837 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1988) (“The range of
external circumstances from which probable bias may be inferred is infinite. Too
much refinement in analyzing their probable effect is out of place. Accurate
concrete rules are almost impossible to formulate, and where possible are
usually undesirable. In general, these circumstances should have some clearly
apparent force, as tested by experience of human nature, or, as it is usually put,
they should not be too remote.” (quoting 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 950, at 795
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970))). Modern commentators discuss only the doctrine
and foundation for bias impeachment, deeming the underlying rationale
apparently too familiar for discussion. See, e.g., PARK, supra note 92,
§ 9.10, at 497-501.
129. Abel, 469 U.S. at 52.
130. For this reason, post-arrest statements by accomplices are generally
excluded because of their dubious reliability. See, e.g., Williamson v. United
States, 512 U.S. 594, 608 (1994).
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testimony.131 Kinship and friendship may also motivate a
lie. (What parent wouldn’t be tempted to lie on his child’s
behalf?) The lie may be one that favors or hurts a party.132
Gang membership or political affiliations may also give rise
to bias, depending on circumstances.133
Yet while bias may induce perjury, it also operates
unconsciously to produce sincere yet mistaken testimony.134
Thus, it may affect a person’s perceptions, memory, or
narration (word choice) of events. The trite-but-true saying,
“We see what we want to see” nicely captures bias’s role in
subconsciously shaping our observations.135 And despite our
general belief in stable, “recorded” memories, we
understand that over time memories fade like washed-out
videos or yellowing photographs, leaving bleached images
selected by the mind’s eye because they conform to our
predilections. Put differently, bias shapes how and what we
remember of even life’s most important events. Narrative
accuracy may also be sacrificed by bias. Our choice of words
131. See, e.g., United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1552 (5th Cir. 1994).
This is an old problem. See LANGBEIN, supra note 12, at 148.
132. See S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Lewy, 799 F.2d 1281, 1298 n.11 (9th Cir. 1986).
133. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 54 (explaining how membership by witnesses and
defendant in a prison gang, the Aryan Brotherhood, was relevant to bias
because the gang’s credo required members to lie and commit crimes to protect
other members); United States v. Arias-Izquierdo, 449 F.3d 1168, 1180 (11th
Cir. 2006) (holding that membership in Cuban Communist party “did not, by
definition,” impugn the credibility of key witnesses); United States v. Keys, 899
F.2d 983, 987 (10th Cir. 1990). In Keys, the prosecution failed to prove that the
defendant and witnesses belonged to a prison gang, but defendant’s statement
that “he controlled sixty soldiers in the prison system who would do him favors,
including breaking the law,” was relevant to prove fear-induced bias. 899 F.2d
at 987; see also State v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn. 2007). Brown held
that the defense failed to lay a foundation of “common gang membership” and
that “membership in a gang, by itself, does not necessarily have a direct bearing
on the fact of bias or the source and strengths of the witness’s bias.” 739 N.W.2d
at 720.
134. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 52.
135. See RASHOMON (Daiei Motion Picture Co. Aug. 25, 1950), a classic film
portraying different versions of the same event from the varying perspectives of
the witnesses. The aphorism “we see what we want to see” is firmly embedded
in our culture and used is diverse settings. See, e.g., Carlo Ungaro, Seeing What
We Want to See, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01
/22/opinion/22iht-edungaro.3.9407834.html (applying this aphorism to military
involvement in Afghanistan).
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often reflects deep-seated convictions and feelings which
may be effectively exposed on cross-examination, where the
witness’s responses are necessarily more extemporaneous
than carefully crafted written statements.
Not only does bias often affect all four core testimonial
assumptions, it also cuts across other modes of
impeachment.136 Abel illustrates bias’s legal dexterity. As we
have seen, Mills’ testimony impeached Ehle under four
different modes: (1) bias, (2) a specific instance of untruthful
conduct, (3) a prior inconsistent statement, and (4)
contradiction.137 And the befuddled lawyer who asks, “Which
one is it?” is asking the wrong question because the Abel
Court trenchantly observed that the proponent may choose
any or all depending on the situation.138
Regardless of bias’s probative value, its familiarity to
lay jurors, and rules that favor its use, lawyers are not
obligated to pursue a witness’s bias or lack thereof.
Charitably, we may say that bias is left to the lawyer’s
tactical judgment; less charitably we must appreciate that
its effective use will turn on the lawyer’s creativity,
preparation, and trial skills. There is no commanding
principle that directs an exploration of a witness’s interest
in a case, much less that it be done effectively. In extreme
cases a criminal defense lawyer’s negligence may give rise
136. Where bias implicates other forms of impeachment, some courts have
ordained hybrid procedures, such as requiring that the witness be given an
opportunity to explain or deny a prior statement regarding bias. Rules of this
sort straddle traditional bias impeachment (wide open) and the use of prior
statements. See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6095, at 649-51. When faced
with overlapping impeachment modes, most courts seem to permit the
proponent to select whichever is most advantageous subject to the discretion of
the trial judge. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 39, at 176-77. But see
GIANNELLI, supra note 92, § 22.04[B], at 266 (asserting that “most” jurisdictions
require cross-examination of the witness before permitting extrinsic proof of the
bias).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
138. Abel, 469 U.S. at 56. The issue appealed in Abel, of course, did not involve
Mills’ testimony attacking Ehle, but rather Ehle’s rebuttal testimony regarding
gang members’ duty to protect other members. Ehle’s rebuttal testimony was
relevant to Mills’ gang-related bias yet it also constituted a specific instance of
Mill’s untruthful character, which could not be proved by extrinsic evidence
(Ehle) under the rules. Id.; see FED. R. EVID. 608(b). The Court’s short answer
was that extrinsic evidence could be used to prove Mills’ bias; thus, it did not
matter that it was inadmissible under other rules. Abel, 469 U.S. at 55-56.
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to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,139 but otherwise
bias is left to the lawyers and the realm of caprice.
In sum, bias seemingly merits “most-favored rule”
status in impeachment doctrine. Its protean form, its
ubiquity in everyday life and corresponding lay familiarity,
its range across all four testimonial assumptions, and its
overlap with other modes of impeachment combine to make
bias the most accessible, readily understandable, and useful
form of impeachment.
B. Defects in Testimonial Capacity
The law of evidence assumes that witnesses have four
core “capacities.”140 They are the capacity to be sincere (to
testify truthfully), to perceive accurately through the five
senses, to remember (record) those perceptions, and to
narrate (describe) those memories later while testifying in
court. There is nothing particularly esoteric about them. In
daily life we constantly factor in a person’s bad vision, poor
hearing, immaturity, weak memory, or inarticulate
ramblings when assessing his credibility. Few would credit
a three-year-old child in the same way we might assess a
thirty-year-old adult who witnessed a car accident.
Under the common law, a severe defect in one capacity
or another might result in a finding of incompetency, which
disqualified the person as a witness.141 The modern
approach, however, deems all persons qualified to be
witnesses while permitting robust impeachment of any
defective capacity.142 Nonetheless, the law focuses on only
139. See, e.g., Daniels v. Knight, 476 F.3d 426, 435 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Here,
Daniels’ trial counsel made a tactical decision to subject one of Daniels’ cohorts
to more intensive cross-examination, while going easier on the traumatized son
of the murder victim. Because Streett had an independent, non-tainted basis for
his in-court identification, we find the conduct of Daniels’ trial counsel conduct
fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
141. See supra text accompanying note 28.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31; see also 27 WRIGHT & GOLD,
supra note 5, § 6097, at 673 (“[A] basic assumption underlying Rule 601 is that
capacity evidence will be admissible to expose reliability problems associated
with testimony from such witnesses.”). Some cases permit disqualification of an
individual so lacking in one or more capacities that she cannot provide relevant
testimony. See GIANNELLI, supra note 92, § 18.02, at 218 n.8.
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three of the four capacities: perception, memory, and
narration. The fourth capacity, sincerity, is subtracted more
or less out of despair. Evidence law recognizes no religious
or scientific measures of one’s capacity for sincerity.143 The
closest the law comes to grappling with a witness’s capacity
for sincerity is the oath/affirmation requirement and
inquiries into a witness’s character for truthfulness
(discussed below).144
Impeachment for defects in testimonial capacity
parallels bias impeachment in most respects. Like bias,
there is no specific rule that governs this practice in the
FRE. Rather, it too is deemed integral to the relevance of
the witness’s testimony under Rule 401.145 Defects in one’s
capacity to perceive or to remember directly impact the
witness’s personal knowledge, a determination entrusted to
the trier of fact by Rule 602.146 The defect may be one
present at the time of perception (bad eyesight) or while
testifying (intoxication).147 Wide-latitude is permitted on
cross-examination to explore the defect. This may include
143. Religious inferences are forbidden by FRE Rule 610. Polygraphs, voice
stress analyzers, and other “truth detectors” are geared toward the reliability of
particular testimony, not the witness’s capacity as such. Regardless, they are
given a chilly reception in courts when not excluded altogether. See, e.g., United
States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (holding that a per se rule excluding
polygraph evidence did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to present a
defense).
144. FED. R. EVID. 603 (oath or affirmation requirement); FED. R. EVID. 608
(witness’s character for truthfulness); see infra text accompany notes 163-86
(impeachment related to untruthful character).
145. FED. R. EVID. 401; see GIANNELLI, supra note 92, § 22.05, at 267 (“Mental
condition is sometimes relevant to credibility.”); 2 GRAHAM, supra note 102,
§ 607:4, at 484 (“The capacity and actuality of a witness’ perception, his ability
to record and remember sense impressions, and his ability to comprehend
questions and narrate are relevant to an assessment of the weight to be given a
witness’ testimony.”).
146. FED. R. EVID. 602; see 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6097, at 673-74
(“[T]he admissibility of capacity evidence is an essential part of the scheme
created by the Evidence Rules to deal with unreliable testimony.”); Ladd, supra
note 11, at 258. Ladd forecasts the greater use of psychiatrists with “respect to
the capabilities of subnormal witnesses . . . .” Ladd, supra note 11, at 258.
147. See 2 GRAHAM, supra note 102, § 607:5, at 493 (drug or alcohol use at the
time of the event or while testifying may affect the witness’s ability to perceive,
record, recollect, and narrate); see also GIANNELLI, supra note 92, § 22.05, at
267.
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an in-court demonstration, as where a witness’s vision or
hearing is tested before the trier of fact. Like bias, defects in
testimonial capacity is also deemed a non-collateral issue,
which means that the proponent (usually the crossexaminer) need not “take the answer.”148 Extrinsic evidence
(other lay or expert witnesses) may be used to prove up the
defect,149 subject to the trial judge’s discretion under Rule
403 and Rule 611.150
When defects in capacity are within the realm of
common sense and everyday experience, they may be proved
through lay testimony and are readily understandable by
the jury. The testimony may come from the target witness
on cross-examination (usually) or from another witness with
personal knowledge of the defect (“She wasn’t wearing her
glasses.”). The case law draws no refined distinctions among
defects pointed at perception, memory, or narration, settling
instead for a rather generic approach to defective capacity.
Suppose, for example, that a witness had five beers shortly
before observing a car accident. At the scene he gave an
incoherent account to police yet at trial his testimony is
detailed, confident, and compelling. Cross-examination is
readily permitted on the issue of intoxication, including how
much he drank, in what time period, and how he “felt”
(“Weren’t you drunk that night?”). Other witnesses,
including the police officer who interviewed him, may testify
to opinions about the target witness’s intoxication at the
scene. How the alcohol may have affected his perception,
memory, and narration (his statements to police at the
scene) are left for the lawyers to argue in closing and the
jury to sort through as best it can. The larger point is that
148. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 44, at 206-08. McCormick
asserts that where a witness suffers from an “abnormality” that affects her
capacity to perceive or remember, “this condition is provable, on cross or by
extrinsic evidence, to impeach.” Id. at 208. In contrast, “defects of mind within
the range of normality” are subject to the judge’s discretion, particularly with
respect to extrinsic evidence. Id. at 207.
149. See 2 GRAHAM, supra note 102, § 607:4, at 448; MCCORMICK, supra note 7,
§ 44, at 206; PARK, supra note 92, § 9.11, at 501; 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note
5, § 6097, at 674-75.
150. FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing the judge to exclude relevant, otherwise
admissible evidence); FED. R. EVID. 611 (providing that the judge has the power
to control the mode and order of interrogation); see GIANNELLI, supra note 92,
§ 22.05, at 267 (asserting that there is no “hard and fast rule” on extrinsic
evidence to prove sensory or mental defects).
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alcohol, for example, may affect the various capacities very
differently, yet our common experience comfortably blurs
them together.
In assessing relevancy, though, it is helpful to
distinguish among the three capacities. Defects in
perception relate to flaws in one or more of the five senses:
sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Sight and hearing
problems dominate the case law. Some defects, such as poor
eyesight or partial deafness, may be permanent. Others
may be temporary when induced by alcohol and drugs or
caused by trauma. Although defective perception is usually
keyed to observations of the underlying event (the car
accident), a witness’s drug or alcohol use while testifying is
clearly relevant as well, although one might ask whether
the concern here has more to do with memory (recalling the
car accident) than perception (understanding the lawyer’s
questions). This example illustrates that while evidence law
distinguishes perception from memory, it tracks popular
usage by not insisting upon rigid definitions and by leaving
the interaction of memory and perception largely
unexplained. We commonly experience people with “bad
memories,” giving little thought to whether the problem is
one of not grasping the question, an inability to “retrieve”
the memory, or obliteration of the recorded memory itself. A
witness’s poor memory may be shown in different ways. She
might admit the fact (“I have a poor memory”), another
witness could offer a lay opinion (“I’ve known her well for
years and she has a bad memory”), or an in-court
experiment might test her memory.151 Finally, people with
limited language skills or other afflictions may be poor
narrators of events.152 The deficiency may arise because of
age (young, old) or because the witness’s lack of education or
experience impoverishes her vocabulary. Thus, an eightyear-old child is ill-equipped to describe the speed of a car.
151. There are several simple tests given to persons believed to be suffering
from early onset dementia (i.e. Alzheimer’s disease). The object here is not to
diagnose dementia, but to show that the witness’s capacity for memory is
impaired. For an example of a “mini mental state examination,” see The
Forgetting:
A
Portrait
of
Alzheimer’s,
http://www.pbs.org/theforget
ting/diagnosis/testing.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).
152. For example, Tourette’s Syndrome affects the narrative capacity. See
Nat’l Tourette Syndrome Ass’n, What is Tourette Syndrome?, http://www.tsausa.org/Medical/whatists.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).
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In some cases expert testimony is necessary to show
that a condition is relevant to the witness’s testimonial
capacity. The expert educates the court about how the
witness’s mental health history affected his capacity to
perceive, to remember, or to describe events. Not all mental
illnesses or disabilities are relevant.153 Depression, for
example, does not entail an inability to distinguish reality
from fantasy like some other disorders. Witnesses who may
be suffering from early stages of dementia may present an
otherwise normal demeanor that requires qualification by a
doctor or psychologist who can educate the jury about the
witnesses’ limits.
Yet the use of such experts invites a clash between
modern psychology and evidence law, which, as we have
seen, is based on a popular (lay) psychology with
nineteenth-century roots.154 Psychologists today often speak
of “cognition” and contend that memory is dynamic and
fluid.155 The legal model of perception and memory as
recorded images, like those of a digital camera, strikes them
as simplistic or just wrong.156 Put differently, the
testimonial assumptions that form the core of modern
evidence law are inconsistent with many of the
presuppositions of modern psychology.157 Evidence law,
though, continues to trump modern psychology largely
because the latter has failed to supplant popular thinking
(literally) with another, acceptable model. Absent a
compelling, acceptable alternative, there is little reason for
the legal system to jettison its time-tested assumptions that
are shared by the lay public generally and which serve to
legitimate the outcomes of trials.
Case law on expert testimony offered to show defective
testimonial capacities, especially that involving mental

153. PARK, supra note 92, § 9.11, at 504-05; 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5,
§ 6097, at 686.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
155. See Loftus et al., supra note 94, at 177.
156. See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6011, at 139 (“[M]any scientists
dispute the validity of the video camera theory of memory.”).
157. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 44, at 206 (“In truth, the limits of human
powers of perception should probably be studied more intensively in the interest
of a more accurate, objective administration of justice.”).
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illness, is sparse compared to bias impeachment.158 Criminal
defendants often lack the resources to pay experts of any
genus, much less such an exotic species. The cost for any
party must be weighed against the risk that a judge might
exclude such testimony as unhelpful or insufficiently
reliable under Rule 702.159 And even where admissible, a
jury may well tune out a PhD, whose seemingly odd,
bookish ideas run counter to common sense and everyday
experience.160
This clash is most evident where expert testimony is
offered to show the limits of lay witnesses of normal
capacities, particularly the shortcomings of eyewitness
identifications.
Despite
“impressive”
documentation
showing the weakness of eyewitness testimony, courts have
steadfastly resisted expert testimony on grounds that it
provides little appreciable assistance to the trier of fact and
usurps the jury’s role of determining credibility.161 The
issue, though, is less one of usurpation and more one of why
and when a jury needs expert help when the witness has
normal capacities to perceive, to remember, and to describe
(i.e. there is no “defect”).
In sum, the doctrine governing defective testimonial
capacities is squarely rooted in testimonial assumptions
that are fully consistent with popular thinking. When lay
and expert testimony conforms to those same assumptions,
evidence law permits wide ranging inquiry on defective
capacities. Nonconforming testimony not only conflicts with

158. See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6097, at 676 (“Attacking witness
capacity sometimes raises difficult issues.”). The problem of hypnotically
refreshed testimony has sparked considerable debate in the courts and is
excellent fodder for discussion in law school textbooks. See, e.g., DAVID P.
LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2008) (devoting roughly two pages
to defects in capacity, id. at 441-43, and nearly eight pages to hypnotically
refreshed testimony, id. at 33-41).
159. FED. R. EVID. 702; see Faigman, supra note 111, at 304-13.
160. Judges also factor in the “hired expert’s tendency toward overstatement.”
27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6097, at 691.
161. See id. at 705. The authors point to a “new willingness” by the courts to
permit such expert assistance, but it is unclear whether this evinces a seachange in thinking. Nor is it clear whether the “new willingness” stems from
dissatisfaction with the prevailing legal model or a loss of faith in trial lawyers’
ability to expose eyewitnesses’ fallibility. Id. at 706.
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controlling doctrine, it threatens the very legitimacy of fact
finding in the modern trial.
C. Truthful Character, Specific Instances of Untruthful
Conduct, and Prior Convictions
Evidence of a witness’s truthful character is but another
way of asking if he is a liar. We are comfortably familiar
with the vague but compelling idea that people have a
character trait for truthfulness, some people having greater
regard for “truthfulness” than others.162 Since the jury is
blissfully ignorant of witnesses’ backgrounds, the law
provides a clumsy mechanism for proving their truthful
character, positive or negative. Thus, for example, in United
States v. Abel it was relevant that several key witnesses, as
well as the defendant, belonged to a secret prison gang
whose members were sworn to lie on one another’s behalf.163
No other form of impeachment has provoked more
confusion and criticism. The problems are partly triggered
by awkward rules but the real difficulty may lie at the core
of what is meant by “truthful character,” its relationship to
the common law testimonial assumptions, and an undue
fixation on perjury.
In contrast to the free-market principles regulating
evidence of bias and defects in testimonial capacity,
impeachment of a witness’s character for truthfulness is
closely regulated by Rules 608 and 609.164 The rules are
concerned with a single, ostensibly narrow character trait:
“truthfulness.”165 And the truthful character must be that of

162. I will generally speak of a “truthful character” with the understanding
that it may be more or less in certain people. This minimizes the need to
distinguish constantly between “truthful” and “untruthful” character.
163. 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984).
164. FED. R. EVID. 608, 609.
165. See 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE, § 6117, at 12 (Supp. 2009). As originally drafted, Rule
608 obliquely addressed “credibility”, which caused undue confusion about
whether the rule applied more broadly than to a witness’s truthful character.
FED. R. EVID. 608. The 2003 amendment to Rule 608 unambiguously limits the
rule to a witness’s truthful character. FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee note
(amended 2003).
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a “witness.”166 Together, Rules 608 and 609 regulate three
forms of proof: (1) the use of character witnesses, positive or
negative; (2) prior specific instances of conduct relevant to
truthful character; and (3) prior criminal convictions.167 We
will consider the doctrines regulating this form of evidence
before turning to broader policy issues.
Character witnesses provide testimony about another
witness’s (the “principal’s”) truthful character. The law
assumes that all witnesses have the requisite (good)
character for truthfulness until there is an assertion to the
contrary, although it may be more accurate to say that until
a witness’s truthful character is attacked, the court will not
spend time on the subject. Character witnesses may be used
for the express purpose of proving the principal witness’s
character for untruthfulness. No evidence of truthful
character is permitted unless the principal witness has been
attacked for having an “untruthful” character. Proof that a
witness is mistaken or even lying is not sufficient; the
assertion must be that the witness is a “liar” generally.168
Character witnesses may testify in the form of
reputation or opinion once it is established that they have
sufficient personal knowledge of the principal witness.169
Reputation demands a character witness’s familiarity with
gossip about the principal’s truthful character (good or
166. The rules apply to all witnesses regardless of the content of their
testimony, lay or expert. Hearsay declarants’ character for truthfulness may
also be shown. FED. R. EVID. 805, 806.
167. FED. R. EVID. 608, 609.
168. See FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (“[E]vidence of truthful character is admissible
only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by
opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.”). The character attack is most
often launched on cross-examination of the principal witness, but it may also be
leveled during an opening statement—“We’ll prove that Witness X is a liar.”
Regardless of form or timing, evidence of a principal witness’s truthful character
is thereafter admissible. See 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6116, at 66.
169. See United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 616-18 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(finding that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when excluding
defense character witnesses offered to prove the untruthful character of a law
enforcement officer called by the prosecution, because the defense failed to
provide a sufficient foundation for their reputation and opinion testimony; one
witness, a reporter, wrote a story involving the cop, another was a “local defense
counsel” who proffered an opinion about the cop’s reputation among the “court
community,” and the third was an “acquaintance” from the neighborhood where
the cop “worked”); 2 GRAHAM, supra note 102, § 608:3, at 576.
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bad).170 Opinion testimony requires sufficient contacts upon
which to base a helpful opinion about the principal witness’s
truthful character.171 Nonetheless, either foundation is
wholly conclusory because the direct examiner may not
elicit any specific conduct to support the opinion or
reputation.172 The evidence, though, must relate only to the
principal witness’s truthful character, not any other trait.
Finally, neither a character witness nor any other witness
may testify that some other witness is testifying truthfully
or accurately.173
Rule 608(b) commands that specific instances of one’s
truthful character may only be brought out on crossexamination.174 And because cross-examiners are most often
focused on impeaching a witness’s credibility, such specific
conduct is inexorably negative, consisting of prior deceitful
acts, lies, and misrepresentations of all varieties.175 Effective
cross-examiners ask about the details, a process that makes
the prior lie more “vivid” while permitting multiple
questions regardless of the answers.176 Any witness, lay or
expert, may be cross-examined about his prior untruthful
conduct.177 Character witnesses may be cross-examined

170. See FED. R. EVID. 803(21).
171. See FED. R. EVID. 701.
172. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
173. See, e.g., Liggett v. People, 135 P.3d 725, 729-32 (Colo. 2006). Liggett
adopts the majority rule that finds such questions “categorically improper.” Id.
at 732.
174. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 618-22 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (holding that the trial court erred by precluding the defense from crossexamining a prosecution witness about three specific instances of untruthful
conduct, including one in which a judge found that the witness had “lied” in a
different proceeding); United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 19 (1st Cir. 2001)
(finding that a prosecutor properly cross-examined defendant about whether he
had altered company records such as time cards, acts which he denied).
176. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 41, at 182-83 (noting that a witness may be
pressed but the cross-examiner must ultimately “take [the] answer”); 28 WRIGHT
& GOLD, supra note 25, § 6112, at 34-35, § 6117, at 79.
177. See FED. R. EVID. 608. The cross-examiner must have a good faith basis
for inquiring into the specific conduct, which spares most witnesses the agony of
chronicling their past lies in response to an open-ended question such as, “Tell
us about all the lies you’ve ever told?” See United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d
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about the principal’s prior acts.178 The cross-examiner,
however, must take the witness’s answer (or, more
accurately, answers). Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to
prove up the specific conduct under Rule 608(b), although
other theories of admissibility may well permit this result.179
For example, in United States v. Abel the impeaching
evidence was relevant not only to a witness’s untruthful
character, but also to his bias, a non-collateral matter that
may be proved by extrinsic evidence.180
Although Rule 608(b) invites its share of evidentiary
mischief, it pales when compared to the damaging effect of a
witness’s prior criminal convictions, particularly where the
criminal defendant testifies. Rule 609 permits the use of
some prior criminal convictions because, it is assumed, they
are probative of the witness’s untruthful character.181 All
convictions for crimes involving “dishonesty or false
statement” are admissible.182 Felony convictions are also
admissible,
subject
to
the
court’s
discretion.183
Misdemeanors are inadmissible unless they are crimes of
false statement or dishonesty.184 Under the majority
at 23. Commentators have been very critical of the unfair prejudice engendered
by Rule 608(b). See 2 GRAHAM, supra note 102, § 608:4, at 611-12.
178. 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 2, § 6120, at 124.
179. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
180. 469 U.S. 45 (1984); see also supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
181. FED. R. EVID. 609; see 2 GRAHAM, supra note 102, §§ 609:3-:6 (discussing
doctrine); MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 42; 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 25,
§ 6133.
182. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). It is immaterial whether the offense is a felony or
a misdemeanor. The only effective limitation is the ten-year rule set forth in
FRE Rule 609(b). See 2 GRAHAM, supra note 102, § 609:5; 28 WRIGHT & GOLD,
supra note 25, §§ 6135-6136 (1993 & Supp. 2008).
183. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). The criminal defendant’s prior felony convictions
are excluded unless the prosecution shows that their probative value
“outweighs” their prejudicial effect. All other witnesses in civil and criminal
trials are subject to the balancing test in Rule 403, which favors of admissibility
unless the opponent shows that such probative value is “substantially
outweighed” by unfair prejudice and the like. FED. R. EVID. 403; see 2 GRAHAM,
supra note 102, § 609:3, at 648; 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 25, § 6134, at
215-16.
184. FED. R. EVID. 609(a). Juvenile adjudications are generally inadmissible,
although the court has discretion to allow them in a narrow band of cases. FED.
R. EVID. 609(d).
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approach, Rule 609 provides the court discretion to admit
varying levels of detail, including the nature of the offense
(e.g., “armed robbery”), the date of conviction, and the
sentence.185 Other jurisdictions follow variants of the “mere
fact” rule, which permits evidence of only the “fact” of prior
convictions; details, including the nature of the offense, are
withheld to reduce unfair prejudice.186
Turning to how these doctrines affect our testimonial
assumptions, evidence of truthful character impacts only
that of sincerity; that is, whether the witness is honestly
(sincerely) describing his memory of events.187 It has no
discernable relevance to a witness’s accuracy of perception,
recollection, or narration because it tells us nothing about
whether a witness is honestly mistaken, only whether he or
she is lying or being truthful (even if incorrect).188 The
efficacy of truthful character evidence turns on how well it
functions to identify a liar in the courtroom, being especially
mindful that the law eschews both religious and scientific
tests for this purpose.189
The seminal point, however, must be what is meant by
truthful or untruthful character? Its existence is usually
assumed without careful definition or critical thought.190
185. 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 25, § 6134, at 216-17; see also 2 GRAHAM,
supra note 102 § 609:6, 692-98; MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 42, at 196-98; e.g.,
United States v. Smith, 454 F.3d 707, 715 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he court ruled
that it would allow the government to ask Smith whether he had been convicted
of a felony, when he was convicted and what the offense was.”).
186. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 42, at 199-200.
187. See 2 GRAHAM, supra note 102, § 608:1, at 557; Ladd, supra note 11, at
242.
188. Ladd, supra note 11, at 241-42.
189. FED. R. EVID. 610 (religious beliefs cannot be used to determine
credibility). Polygraphs and similar tests are also generally excluded. See
GIANNELLI, supra note 92, § 24.08.
190. Uviller observes that the “trait of truthfulness” is in accord with “common
intelligence” and “emanates from personality,” which straddles the realms of
everyday common experience and modern personality theory. Uviller, supra
note 5, at 786. McCormick is clearly unsettled about character for truthfulness,
contending that it is a “poor predictor of whether [a witness] is truthful on a
specific occasion” and an anachronism left over from the “pioneer trial” which
must give way to the “businesslike atmosphere of the modern courtroom.”
MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 178; see also 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 25,
§ 6113, at 43 (“[W]itness character evidence may be defined as evidence that
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The notion of character traits, including truthfulness, is so
familiar in our everyday thinking about people that close
scrutiny seems unwarranted. Yet it is this very same
familiarity that defines character as a social and cultural
construct deserving more rigorous analysis. Truthful
character, like any character trait, is a product of popular
culture with roots deeply set in a very different historical
context.191 Moreover, the nineteenth-century conception of
character, steeped in that period’s commitment to a “moral
science” influenced by Scottish common sense and faculty
psychology, not to mention a heavy dose of Protestant
theology, coincided with emergence of evidence law.192
directly relates to the general credibility of the witness, rather than the
believability of specific testimony, and conveys some judgment about the ethics
or moral qualities of that witness.”). Other commentators seemingly accept
“truthful character” without discussion. E.g., PARK, supra note 92, § 9.06.
191. For the influence of nineteenth-century moral philosophy on conceptions
of character, see DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE
AMERICAN WHIGS 29, 266 (1979); and Alan C. Guelzo, “The Science of Duty”:
Moral Philosophy and the Epistemology of Science in Nineteenth-Century
America, in EVANGELICALS AND SCIENCE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 267 (David
N. Livingstone et al. eds., 1999).
192. See HOWE, supra note 191, at 29-32 (brilliantly explaining how “Whig”
thinkers transformed eighteenth-century conceptions of character to serve an
emerging commercial society and economy); id. at 266 (discussing Abraham
Lincoln while noting “the Whig preoccupation with character building and
control”); Guelzo, supra note 191, at 267 (“‘[M]oral philosophy’ was the offspring
of a misbegotten attempt to blend Enlightenment science and Protestant
theology . . . .”); id. at 271 (“[F]undamentally what moral philosophy asked was
that human conduct, or ethics, be understood to embody, or at least resemble,
the methodology of science.”); id. at 273 (observing that the Scot’s insistence
that people possessed a “moral sense” provided “the moral philosophers all the
reason and all the credibility they needed for discovering a scientific moral order
that would, incidentally, be in a position to prescribe Christian moral order
without looking too Christian”); id. at 275 (“[A]mong [the many character]
‘traits’ and ‘courses’ [of conduct] the moral philosophers easily found all the
familiar constituents of Christian morality.”). The point is not that these same
mid-nineteenth century cultural constructs somehow remain fossilized in
present-day social discourse or legal doctrine. Rather, the point is to appreciate
how differently we may understand character today when compared to the
antebellum social, intellectual, and cultural environment in which many of our
evidence rules were brewed. The failure to define character in twenty-first
century popular thought makes it a tempting strawman for critics, particularly
for those who see psychology as holding perhaps more promise than it can
possibly deliver at present. These legal developments are nicely captured in
Wesson, supra note 7, and Poulin, supra note 109.
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Today’s culture continues to recognize various traits of
character but in an amorphous, far different, and desultory
manner that seems largely oblivious to how that flaccid
concept has itself changed over the last 150 years.
Nonetheless, character remains one important way our
society sorts people for various purposes. The legal
profession, for example, revels in character proof generally.
Reference letters on behalf of job applicants are in effect
character testimonials, the writer attesting to the
applicant’s desirable traits, including his trustworthiness,
honesty, diligence, etc. Bar admission typically requires
proof of applicants’ “good moral character.”193 Character’s
roots in popular thinking is evident in how we prove the
person’s traits. The common law limited proof to reputation,
namely gossip and small talk about the person among the
local community.194 Recognizing that reputation evidence
often consisted of little more than the character witness’s
personal opinion, the FRE explicitly allows proof by lay
opinion as well.195 The lay opinion must be predicated upon
personal knowledge, which is to say on frequent contacts
and interactions at work or in the neighborhood, for
example.196
Since “opinion” is not expressly restricted to lay
testimony in Rule 608, some courts allow expert testimony,
perhaps beguiled by the lure of modern psychology,
exasperated by the amorphousness of “character,” and
uneasy with character’s roots in popular culture.197 Left
193. E.g., The N.Y. State Bd. of Law Examiners, Rules of the Court, Rule
520.12, http://www.nybarexam.org/Rules/Rules.htm#520.12 (last visited Feb. 9
2010) (“Every applicant for admission to practice must file . . . affidavits of
reputable persons that the applicant possesses the good moral character and
general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law as required by
section 90 of the Judiciary Law”).
194. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee note. The FRE still recognizes
reputation as a method of proving character. See FED. R. EVID. 405, 608.
Reputation is, of course, hearsay (gossip) but is excepted by FRE Rule 803(21).
195. See FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee note.
196. FED. R. EVID. 701 (stating that lay opinion must be helpful and based on
the witness’s firsthand knowledge); see also FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory
committee note.
197. See 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 25, § 6114, at 56 (asserting that
“many courts” admit expert testimony on truthful character); see also FED. R.
EVID. 405 advisory committee note (asserting without qualification or citation
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unaddressed is how an expert’s “specialized knowledge”
bears on something as banal as truthful character: If
truthful character is a social and cultural construct based
on community interaction, it is manifestly unclear how
psychologists and psychiatrists can assist the trier of fact on
this point.198 And if such experts are drawing instead upon
their esoteric knowledge of mental illnesses and how they
affect a person’s perceptions and memory, this may be
relevant to a witness’s testimonial capacities (discussed
above), but it does not bear on what we popularly
understand as truthful character.199 In sum, truthful
character is something that lay witnesses and jurors
frequently encounter in their daily lives; it is a peculiarly
lay construct that by definition falls outside the scope of
expert opinion testimony.200
Finally, how effectively does truthful character help us
assess the testimonial assumption of sincerity? Here we
encounter a chasm between rhetoric and reality. Prima
facie, the allure is irresistible: persons of untruthful
that “[n]o effective dividing line exists between character and mental capacity,”
thus, character may be proved in “varying ways,” including an employer’s
opinion about the person’s honesty and “the opinion of [a] psychiatrist based
upon examination and testing”); MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 44, at 209-14
(expressing unease about expert opinion testimony offered to prove truthful
character). For a thoughtful article that assumes expert testimony may be used
to prove truthful character, see Poulin, supra note 109.
198. See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 5, § 6097, at 693-95 (observing that
Rule 702 often precludes expert testimony both about a witness’s “general
disposition to tell the truth” and whether a witness testified “truthfully” because
it is of little assistance to the trier of fact and the opinions are not sufficiently
reliable). To be sure, some aspects of personality theory seem analogous to the
cultural construct of character. “Trait psychology” appears to be an updated
reification of common sense thinking that has since been left outside the
scientific mainstream. 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 25, § 6132, at 193 n.9
(referencing Gordon Allport, a leading trait psychologist). Legal commentators
occasionally and understandably conflate the popular construct of “character”
with personality theory without closely considering whether they are materially
different. See id. § 6112, at 33 n.7.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 153-58.
200. See 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 25, § 6113, at 43 (“[W]itness character
evidence may be defined as evidence that directly relates to the general
credibility of the witness, rather than the believability of specific testimony, and
conveys some judgment about the ethics or moral qualities of that witness.”). So
defined, it is difficult to see what light mental health experts can shed on the
“ethics or moral qualities” of others.
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character are more likely to commit perjury while truthful
persons are less likely to do so—the propensity inference.
The relevant link is between the character trait and the
moment the witness testifies. It is doubtful, however, that
the general public has the same faith in character’s surgical
precision as the legal profession. We manifestly do not need
evidence of untruthful character to tell us that a person
might lie; we know to a moral certainty that all human
beings lie in certain situations.201 Rather, character
functions more as a social score card; what does the
community (society?) think of this person?
Character witnesses, then, are a measure of one’s
standing in a community or group. When impressive people,
for example, testify that another witness is truthful, they
are effectively vouching for that witness in the same way as
one who writes a letter of recommendation for another.202
Reputation and opinion testimony run to the bottom line:
Do other people think the witness is “truthful?” It is this
willingness to place one’s own reputation on the line that
distinguishes the character witness. When a cross-examiner
inquires about specific lies, she is providing vivid details
about what the jury assumes anyway: this witness, like all
humans, has occasionally lied and prevaricated. And it is
those details that resonate.
The most problematic form of character evidence,
however, involves prior criminal convictions. In the 1880’s
Oliver Wendell Holmes described the inferences with
Victorian frankness: the prior conviction shows a “general
readiness to do evil” from which one infers a “readiness to

201. See Wilson v. City of Chi., 6 F.3d 1233, 1239 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, C.J.)
(“Trials would be endless if a witness could be impeached by evidence that he
had once told a lie or two. Which of us has never lied?”).
202. The highly publicized public misconduct trial of Alaska senator Ted
Stevens featured all-star character evidence by former secretary of state Colin
Powell and Hawaii senator Daniel Inouye. Powell testified to Stevens’ “sterling”
character and that “‘[h]e’s a guy who, as we said in the infantry, we would take
on a long patrol.’” Erika Bolstad & Richard Mauer, Colin Powell: Stevens
Reputation ‘Sterling’, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 10, 2008, http://www.a
dn.com/2008/10/10/551875/colin-powell-stevens-reputation.html. The notion that
one is “sterling” or worthy of partaking in a “long patrol” underscores the
banality of character itself today. For Ted Stevens, getting Powell and Inouye, a
war hero, to appear on his behalf was the whole point. Id.
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lie” and, therefore, that “he has lied in fact.”203 Rule 609
carries this inclination-toward-“evil” rationale into the
twenty-first century, although modern courts seem plainly
troubled, if not confused, about how prior criminal
convictions affect “credibility.”204 Courts solemnly intone the
verbal formula under Rule 609, yet know that a lay jury will
use the prior convictions as marks of a social outsider,
especially to the detriment of the criminal defendant.205
Evidence of truthful character serves as a window into
the witness’s standing in the community. It reveals less
about whether the witness’s testimony is believable and
much more about whether this is the type of person we
want to believe. The vaunted propensity inference is mostly
gloss that opens the way for evidence, largely negative, that
warns us against placing undue faith in a “disreputable”
witness’s testimony lest we become disreputable.206 Its cost
is considerable, engendering confusion in the trier of fact
and sparking pointless litigation that is seldom worth the
candle.207

203. Gertz v. Fitchburg RR Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884) (Holmes, J.), quoted in
2 GRAHAM, supra note 102, § 609:1, at 629-30. Graham observes that Rule 609 is
“premised upon the assumption that a person with a criminal record has a bad
general character, evidenced by his willingness to disobey the law, and that his
bad general character would lead him to disregard his oath to testify truthfully.”
2 GRAHAM, supra note 102, § 609:1, at 629; see also 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra
note 25, § 6132, at 190-92.
204. See United States v. Howell, 285 F.3d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 2002) (“‘We
are not certain what evidence of two convictions for theft by taking, one
conviction for armed robbery, and one conviction for aggravated assault says
about [the witness’] credibility, but we are certain that the jury should have
been given the opportunity to make that decision.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Burston, 159 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir. 1998))).
205. See 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 25, § 6112, at 34-35.
206. See 2 GRAHAM, supra note 102, § 609:1, at 631-32 (discussing the special
problem of Rule 609 and the criminal defendant as a witness). Limiting
instructions are largely useless and the jury may use the defendant’s prior
conviction to lower its threshold of regret should it be wrong. Id.
207. See United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also
discussion supra note 169.
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D. Prior Statements by Witnesses
Lawyers are rapturous when examining witnesses
about what they said before testifying.208 In part, it may be a
function of trial preparation: lawyers so immerse
themselves in reams of depositions, reports, and pre-trial
interviews that it seems natural to ask a witness about
what he or she said earlier. And in everyday life we also
often consider a person’s prior statements. The commonlyheard expression “he’s talking out of both sides of his
mouth” indicates a person who may be lying or confused
based on his inconsistent statements. Conversely,
consecutive consistent descriptions of events often indicate
a firm memory and careful use of language–or a practiced
liar. Prior statements are sometimes said to be more
trustworthy because the witness’s memory was “fresher”
and freer from bias.209 Nonetheless, the law of evidence
restricts the use of prior statements through both the
hearsay and impeachment doctrines. In this section we will
consider how both prior inconsistent and consistent
statements relate to the common law’s testimonial
assumptions after briefly reviewing the pertinent
evidentiary principles.
The hearsay rules impose a technical barrier that is
easily traversed. Any statement made other than “while
testifying at the trial or hearing” is hearsay if used to prove
“the truth of the matter asserted” (substantive use).210
Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within an exception
or exemption to Rule 802.211 Experienced trial lawyers
readily circumvent the hearsay ban by offering prior
statements, whether consistent or inconsistent, as relevant
to the witness’s “credibility,” not as substantive evidence of
the facts asserted.212 In this event the proponent need not
208. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 34, at 149 (stating that impeachment by
prior inconsistent statement is the “most widely used” method of attack).
209. Id. at 153.
210. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
211. FED. R. EVID. 802.
212. In hearsay parlance, the statement is offered to prove the declarant’s
state of mind, here a prior belief manifest in the out-of-court statement that is
inconsistent or consistent with whatever belief is expressed in his testimony at
trial. GIANNELLI, supra note 92, § 31.06, at 429. But see 28 WRIGHT & GOLD,
supra note 25, § 6206 (Supp. 2008) (asserting, with good cause, that trial
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demonstrate compliance with any hearsay exemption or
exception. When the statement is used substantively,
however, the FRE provides two exemptions expressly
directed at prior inconsistent and consistent statements by
witnesses. Both require that the witness/declarant testify at
the trial or hearing, subject to cross-examination. Prior
inconsistent statements must be shown to have been made
under oath, subject to the penalty for perjury, at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding.213 Consistent statements are
admissible for their truth only “if offered to rebut an express
or implied charge against the declarant[/witness] of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive.”214 Case law
requires that such prior statements antedate the alleged
impropriety if offered for their truth (again, a hurdle easily
avoided by offering the evidence only for “credibility”).215
Nothing in the FRE, though, restricts a witness’s hearsay to
these two rules. When the witness is a party opponent, for
example, her prior statements are freely admissible as party
admissions, which may be used for any relevant purpose,
including impeachment and substantive use.216 Thus, the
hearsay barrier is easily scaled by offering the prior
statement only to prove credibility or by satisfying any one
of about forty exceptions or exemptions.
Impeachment doctrine is even less imposing.217 Other
than relevance, no rules regulate the use of prior consistent
statements to rehabilitate a witness, whether they are
drawn from the witness herself or elicited from other
witnesses who heard them (extrinsic evidence). Prior
lawyers’ “true purpose” is to “expose the jury to the prior inconsistent statement
. . . trusting to the inefficacy of a limiting instruction,” and thereby “improperly
induc[ing] the jury to consider the statement for the truth of the matters
asserted therein.”).
213. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
214. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
215. The substantive use of prior consistent statements is governed by Tome v.
United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995). Tome’s strictures are not applicable when
the statement is offered only for credibility. See United States v. Simonelli, 237
F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2001) (joining the “majority” of circuits holding that Rule
801(d)(1)(B) does not govern when prior statements are offered only for
credibility). Extrinsic evidence may be used to prove prior consistent
statements. See United States v. Green, 258 F.3d 683, 692 (7th Cir. 2001).
216. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
217. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 33, at 149.
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inconsistent statements are subject to the flaccid
requirements of Rule 613. On cross-examination the witness
may be confronted with the prior statement without a
forewarning of what may be coming.218 Extrinsic evidence
(other witnesses) to prove the prior inconsistent statement
may be offered only if the principle witness was given an
opportunity to explain or deny it, unless the interests of
justice require otherwise.219 The statement’s subject matter
must also be non-collateral to justify the resort to extrinsic
evidence.220 Noteworthy is that Rule 613 eased the common
law standards because of perceived “widespread attorney
incompetence.”221 Evidentiary doctrine, then, poses few
significant barriers to the use of prior statements. Hearsay
problems are readily skirted by the expedience of offering
the statements only to show “credibility.” Impeachment
rules are more nettlesome than foreboding.
Yet, what does it really mean when we say a statement
is offered only to prove “credibility”? Prior inconsistent
statements may touch multiple testimonial assumptions,
although much will turn on the nature of the inconsistency.
The critical term “inconsistent” is undefined in the FRE, so
the case law draws directly from common experience to give
it meaning. A prior statement is said to be “inconsistent”
with the witness’s trial testimony if the variance between
the two raises questions about credibility.222 Where the
witness is plainly “blowing hot and cold,” the prior
statement may reveal his insincerity—the cross-examiner
has caught the witness in a lie.223 Yet the range of
218. A standard technique is to “lock” in the witness’s testimony (“Yes, I’m
certain about . . .”) and then confront her with the prior inconsistent statement.
Rule 613(a) only requires that the cross-examiner, upon request, furnish
opposing counsel with the prior statement or its contents (if oral). FED. R. EVID.
613(a); see also EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS § 5.09 (7th
ed. 2008).
219. FED. R. EVID. 613(b); see United States v. Lashmett, 965 F.2d 179, 181-82
(7th Cir. 1992) (holding that extrinsic evidence of prior statements is
admissible).
220. 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 25, § 6206, at 537.
221. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 37, at 160-61 (citing FED. R. EVID. 613
advisory committee note).
222. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 34, at 151; see also GIANNELLI, supra note
92, § 22.10, at 282-83; 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 25, § 6203, at 514.
223. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 34, at 151.
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inconsistencies is limitless, spanning subtle shadings of
meaning (e.g., “dark” versus “black”) to the proverbial stark
contrast (“He ran the red light” versus “He had the green
light”). Easy cases involve a stated intent to lie. Recall that
in United States v. Abel the critical issue was whether Ehle
was lying when he testified that he and Abel committed a
robbery.224 Yet in other cases, an inconsistency may signal
problems with memory or narration.225 A frazzled witness
may agree with both the direct and cross-examiner about
diametrically opposed facts, strongly suggesting she has no
independent memory of the event or is riven with
uncertainty. Discrepancies between the prior statement and
the witness’s testimony may also demonstrate a witness
who is troublingly imprecise in her choice of words. In
either event, the witness is honest but her testimony may
well be inaccurate. The “forgetful witness” problem is even
more complex, but ultimately reduces to whether she is
lying (a feigned lack of recall) or has a poor memory.226 The
larger point is that evidence law cannot calibrate the degree
of inconsistency with the witness’s credibility; rather, the
law gives trial lawyers wide leeway to draw out such
inconsistencies and trusts that the trier of fact resolves the
discrepancies based on our social and cultural experiences.
Roughly the same approach governs prior consistent
statements, which are, by definition, “consistent” with the
witness’s trial testimony and therefore are not needed as
substantive evidence because the testimony serves that
function.227 Their relevance to credibility rests on the
common experience that a consistent “story” indicates
224. 469 U.S. 45 (1984); see also supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
Obviously, Ehle’s alleged prior statement about an intent to lie is inconsistent
with his trial testimony implicating Abel, so the jury had to decide if Ehle had
indeed made that statement.
225. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 34, at 151 (stating that inconsistencies may
show the witness is “uncertain or untruthful”); see also 28 WRIGHT & GOLD,
supra note 25, § 6203, at 514-15, § 6206.
226. See 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 25, § 6203, at 515.
227. See United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2001) (permitting
such statements only for credibility but with the “caution . . . that the line
between substantive use of prior statements and their use to buttress credibility
on rehabilitation is one which lawyers and judges draw but which may be
meaningless to jurors”). The line may well be meaningless to lawyers and judges
too.
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stability in memory and narration—a good memory and
careful word choice. It also speaks to the witness’s
confidence in what she says. In general, it is meaningful to
us whether the witness has said the same thing before,
although the timing, place, and circumstances may well be
critical. Consistency may, of course, also reveal the
practiced lie or a stubborn refusal to think critically (i.e., a
reluctance to admit that one may be mistaken), yet here too
we trust our common experience in sorting through this.
In sum, evidence of prior statements is largely tossed to
the realm of our social experience, trusting that popular
culture will provide sufficient guidance. Yet its effectiveness
turns directly on the lawyers’ skill and preparation in
presenting the prior statements and later explaining their
likely effect on credibility. The perceived “widespread
attorney incompetence” that led to Rule 613’s relaxed
standards, as mentioned above, does little to instill
confidence. As every teacher knows, making the test easier
does not make the student smarter or the teacher more
effective.
E. Impeachment by Contradiction
Left for last, contradiction is the bedrock of the
adversary trial where factual disputes are fueled by
witnesses who testify to different facts. In United States v.
Abel,228 the prosecution called Ehle who testified that he and
Abel committed the robbery. To contradict Ehle, the defense
called Mills who said that Ehle planned to perjure himself
by falsely implicating Abel. The jury was left to choose
between Ehle and Mills. A more mundane example involves
Driver 1 who claims Driver 2 ran the stop sign and struck
his car, while Driver 2 testifies that it was Driver 1 who
disregarded the stop sign.
Contradiction is regulated by a single doctrinal
imperative: the contested issue must be non-collateral,
which generally means one relevant to a claim, charge, or
defense as set forth in the pleadings.229 For example, parties
228. 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
229. See United States v. Fonseca, 435 F.3d 369, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(observing that collateral evidence may be excluded under Rule 403). Bias and
defective testimonial capacity are deemed non-collateral methods of
impeachment. Character witnesses may contradict one another as provided by
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frequently fend off an opposing expert’s opinion on
causation or standard of care by presenting its own expert.
To highlight the differences among witnesses, some courts
permit the proponent to confront witness X with the
conflicting account testified to by witness A, although most
prohibit the questioning of one witness about whether
another witness is lying or being truthful.230
When witness X’s testimony contradicts that of witness
A, any of the four testimonial assumptions may be
implicated. Either witness (or both?) may be lying, as
illustrated by Mills’ challenge to Ehle’s testimony. Mistaken
testimony may also be exposed, as where the contradiction
invites the jury to consider whether one or the other more
accurately observed and remembered the event. Less
frequently, the contradiction may call into question a
witness’s narrative accuracy, as when two witnesses
observe the same event but describe it differently. Which
version “best” describes the event is left for the jury.
Contradiction is something readily understood in
popular culture. Indeed, jurors come to the courthouse
expecting precisely such a clash between opposed witnesses.
Their means of choosing which one to believe consist of the
preceding four methods of impeachment along with the
accumulated life experience that stems from deciding family
squabbles, neighborhood disputes, workplace riffs, and even
fractious faculty meetings.
V. A REVISED APPROACH TO CREDIBILITY, IMPEACHMENT, AND
REHABILITATION
The Federal Rules of Evidence improved the modern
trial in some ways but inadvertently created new problems
while still leaving others to fester. In the 1990s the courts
reacted to perceived abuses involving expert testimony by
Rule 608(a). See supra text accompanying notes 124-25, 145-48 and 164-79. But
see GIANNELLI, supra note 92, § 22.11; MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 49, at 232-24
(noting also that the collateral fact rule does not dilute the cross-examiner’s
opportunity to vigorously press a point with the witness).
230. Compare State v. Johnson, 2004 WI 94, ¶ 22, 273 Wis. 2d 626, ¶ 22, 681
N.W.2d 901, ¶ 22 (2004) (noting that a lay witness may be questioned about
whether another witness is lying in order to clarify discrepancies between their
accounts), with Liggett v. People, 135 P.3d 725, 732 (Colo. 2006) (prohibiting
“were they lying” types of questions).
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obligating trial judges to act as “gatekeepers” to ensure that
only “reliable” specialized knowledge was admitted.231 As
amended in 2000, Rule 702 demands that expert opinions
now be based on “sufficient facts or data” that are subjected
to reliable methodologies and tests.232 Yet lay testimony,
which provides the underlying “facts and data” essential to
fact finding by the expert, not to mention the jury, is subject
to radically less scrutiny and control.233 Put differently, the
reliability of lay testimony is left largely to the caprice of an
adversary system that blithely assumes that trial lawyers
possess sufficient skill and judgment to attack or to support
credibility.
More rigor and structure must be instilled to ensure the
reliability of lay testimony. The suggestions outlined below
do not, it should be emphasized, argue for a Daubert-like
approach to lay testimony. They call upon the judge to play
a more active role than that of a passive observer who
involves herself only upon hearing the word, “objection.”
The task of identifying “reliable” lay testimony is entrusted
to the modern adversary trial which must function with
acceptable rigor and popular participation if it is to retain
legitimacy.
The starting point is Rule 602, which requires that lay
testimony be based on a witness’s personal knowledge,
which in turn ensures the testimony’s reliability. Personal
knowledge, as we have seen, is a lay construct that falls
within the broad mainstream of popular thought.234 For this
reason, when a witness’s personal knowledge is contested
the trial judge shares this decision with the jury: the judge
need only be convinced that a reasonable jury could find
personal knowledge by the witness.
Rule 602 must be taken seriously.235 The first step is to
explicitly embrace the common law’s testimonial
assumptions that are the roots of a witness’s purported
personal knowledge236: Did she accurately perceive the
231. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
232. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note (amended 2000).
233. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee note.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 91-108.
235. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 10; Ladd, supra note 11, at 240 (“The
function of a witness is to communicate matters of his personal knowledge.”).
236. See supra Part III.
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event? Is she accurately recalling it at trial? Does her
testimony accurately describe the memory? And is she being
sincere in her testimony? Explicitly embracing them is
important for multiple reasons. First, modern psychological
science has yet to supplant the common law assumptions
with anything better. Second, this will better enable courts
and commentators to critique and improve trial practice and
evidence rules. Third, the legitimacy of civil and criminal
trials is integrally related to the rootedness of the
testimonial assumptions in popular culture. They resonate
among the public, promoting widespread confidence in
judicial fact-finding and legitimating trial verdicts as public
judgments.
Trial judges must ensure that the jury understands the
testimonial assumptions. The jury should be explicitly
instructed (in the broadest sense) about the assumptions
and how they relate to the modes of impeachment and
rehabilitation. It is important for the jury to understand
that its common sense and life experience are welcomed in
the courtroom and essential to factfinding. The instruction
may take multiple forms. Technical instructions should be
read that describe the assumptions, the modes of
impeachment, and the jury’s role to determine if each
answer by a witness is accurate, a mistake, or a lie.237 The

237. Mason Ladd elaborated upon the multiplicity and interrelatedness of
factors that affect credibility:
Some of the same factors which cause a witness, whose character for
veracity is bad, to give perjured testimony may cause another witness
whose character is good to make mistakes. Truth testing involves a
consideration of the multiple effect [sic] of character, motive,
contradiction, intelligence, knowledge, quality of memory, friendly or
hostile feeling toward the parties, interest, bias and prejudice–all of
which give insight into the probability of reliable testimony. In addition
to these qualitative areas of inquiry the candor and forthrightness of
the witness, his hesitancy or willingness to testify, his evasion or
concealment, his poise or frustration, and his emotional reaction to
questions indicated through his demeanor and conduct on the witness
stand also aid in determining the credit to be given his testimony.
Ladd, supra note 11, at 256-57 (footnotes omitted). Most modern jury
instructions include a standard “credibility” instruction. Most can stand
improvement. E.g., SEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 1
(jury to use its “common sense”). In guiding the jury in “deciding what to
believe” the Seventh Circuit offers the following assistance:
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jury must understand that the law’s standard for witness
credibility is the jury’s common sense; every answer by
every witness implicates the four testimonial assumptions.
It would not be overreacting to give jurors a written
statement to the same effect to promote engaged “learning”
as they listen to testimony. In jurisdictions where jury notetaking is permitted, the assumptions should be included as
a ready reference.238 The judge cannot sit back and assume
that the lawyers will make the necessary points during
their examinations or arguments.
The witness’s demeanor while testifying should be made
an explicit basis for determining credibility. The prime
purpose of viva voce testimony is to ensure that the witness
speaks (“testifies”) before the trier of fact. Our supposition,
mostly cultural, is that such observations yield valuable, if
amorphous, clues to credibility based on speech, eye contact,
and body language. Indeed, it is for this reason that we
tolerate the doctrinal arcana of the hearsay rule. Demeanor
of the witness, then, should be recognized as “evidence” not
only to better instruct the jury about what it should
consider (and does anyway) and why, but also with an eye
toward developing more coherent doctrine which better
accounts for decision-making in adjudication.239
You must decide whether the testimony of each of the witnesses is
truthful and accurate, in part, in whole, or not at all. You also must
decide what weight, if any, you give to the testimony of each witness.
In evaluating the testimony of any witness, [including any party to
the case,] you may consider, among other things:
 the ability and opportunity the witness had to see, hear,
or know the things that the witness testified about;
 the witness’s memory;
 any interest, bias, or prejudice the witness may have;
 the witness’s intelligence;
 the manner of the witness while testifying;
 [the witness’s age];
 and the reasonableness of the witness’s testimony in
light of all the evidence in the case.
Id. § 1.13 (“Testimony of Witnesses”).
238. While note-taking is permitted in the Seventh Circuit, jurors are told that
their notes are not evidence, but rather “aids to your memory.” Id. § 1.07.
239. Instructions sometimes tell the jury to consider “the manner of the
witness while testifying.” See id. § 1.13. But see Oldfather, supra note 4, at 457
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Turning to the rules governing impeachment, there is a
need to rethink them and to take a different approach that
makes the judge a more active participant at trial. Some of
the suggestions entail a different approach to existing rules.
Others argue for more substantial change. The emphasis is
on working within the mainstream of the legal tradition
rather than advocating radical changes that likely will
flounder for pragmatic reasons alone.240
A witness’s bias or interest as well as her “capacities” to
testify are simply too important to be left to chance.
Disclosure of this information should be mandatory because
it is the bedrock of personal knowledge. The common law
sagely recognized the significance of bias and testimonial
capacity when it denominated both as non-collateral issues.
Disinterestedness, or the absence of bias, is significant
regardless of whether bias has been “attacked.” And where
bias or interest is implicated, the disclosure should occur
before the jury hears detailed testimony of the event. For
similar reasons the jury should be informed of the witness’s
capacities to perceive, remember, and narrate. Neither
inquiry consumes much time, particularly when measured
against their usefulness. Scant time is spent asking a
witness about his capacity to see or hear, for example. Such
information should be elicited when the witness provides
information about his “background,” namely, at the start of
the direct examination. The judge herself may question the
witness about these matters in a manner reminiscent of
jury voir dire or, alternatively, ensure that the lawyers do
so. Disclosure of these matters should be as automatic as
taking the oath or affirmation before the jury.241
Contradiction and the use of prior statements, however,
are best left to counsels’ discretion because they necessarily
involve details of the case and tactical judgments in a way
that bias and testimonial capacity do not. Although judges
have the power to interrogate witnesses,242 it is an authority
best left for extreme cases. The sheer abundance of prior
(discussing the limits of “demeanor” in determining credibility, yet focusing on
the “lie/truth” distinction and not the problem of sincerely mistaken testimony).
240. See Uviller, supra note 5, at 778 (arguing for an “enriched inquisitorial
ingredient in the criminal process”).
241. FED. R. EVID. 603.
242. FED. R. EVID. 614.
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statements generated through depositions and discovery
generally foreclose judges from making informed decisions
about how they might be used to attack or support
credibility. Here too, though, the jury would profit from
instruction about how contradiction or prior statements
affect the testimonial assumptions. In particular, the jury
should be educated about how prior inconsistent
statements, while they may mark a liar, may also be
relevant to identifying mistaken perceptions, recollections,
and narrative descriptions. The critical concern is how the
prior statement, whether consistent or inconsistent with
testimony, helps the jury evaluate the testimonial
assumptions. And on this point the FRE should be revised
to eliminate the technical hearsay impediments to using
prior consistent or inconsistent statements. Trial lawyers,
abetted by case law, have wisely circumvented the
restrictions anyway, but at the cost of useless fictions and
confusing jury instructions that breed cynicism and
disrespect for the law.243
The remaining mode, evidence of a witness’s truthful
character, should be eliminated as both a ground for attack
and as a basis for supporting credibility.244 This
recommendation parallels the approach taken by Rule 610,
which excludes proof of a witness’s religious beliefs as
insufficiently helpful in the courtroom, whether to attack or
to support credibility. While religion is off the table,
evidence of prior crimes and deceit bedevil the courts. Rules
608 and 609 trigger some of the fiercest firestorms of
litigation at trial and on appeal while shedding the least

243. See United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2001); discussion
supra text accompanying note 226. The case law experience underscores the
wisdom of the original draft of FRE Rule 801(d)(1)(A), which broadly exempted
all prior inconsistent statements, not just those made under oath, etc. See 28
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 25, § 6202, at 509-10.
244. Religious belief may not be used to attack or support credibility. FED. R.
EVID. 610; see 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 25, § 6152, at 309-10 (discussing
the “low probative value” of this evidence while observing that the rule raises
assumptions that are “open to question” by “many people”). McCormick
expressly links Rule 610 to discarded notions of truthful character. See
MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 46, at 218 (“Today, there is no basis for believing
that the lack of faith in God’s avenging wrath is an indication of greater than
average truthfulness.”).
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light on credibility.245 Truthful character is undeniably a
useful social construct when vetting strangers for jobs and
the like. That a socially distinguished person “vouches” for
another is generally regarded as a useful way of ranking an
applicant relative to others, just as knowing some “dirt”
provides the opposite perspective. Yet, at bottom, evidence
of a witness’s “untruthful” character tells us nothing the
jury does not already know. All people lie depending on the
circumstances.246 Specific instances of untruthful conduct
merely give detail (time, place, and circumstance) to the
known certainty that this witness, like all others, has told a
lie or been deceitful. Evidence of prior criminal convictions
bear no obvious relevancy to truth-telling in-and-of-itself,
and in the case of a criminal defendant only serves to lower
the jury’s threshold of regret. Most salient is that Rules 608
and 609 ham-handedly address only a witness’s sincerity,
that is, whether she is deliberately lying in court. Unlike
the other four modes which are also applicable to the risk of
mistaken testimony, truthful character is unhelpfully
focused on perjury.247
The loss of truthful character evidence is
inconsequential. Juries fully comprehend that people are
occasionally prone to deceit and dissimulation. The absence
of such evidence may be accounted for by instructing the
jury that no such evidence (e.g., prior criminal record) will
be heard regarding any witness in the case and should not
be speculated about. Rather, the jury should rely on its own
life experiences and evaluation of the witness’s testimony in
court. The assumption is that an explicit warning about
what the jury will not hear will forestall speculation or
unwarranted inferences about witnesses’ life history. Of
course, prior convictions and uncharged misconduct
relevant to bias or as other acts evidence under Rule 404(b)
may be admissible under those theories.248

245. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20, 180, 187; see also Paul
Bergman, Admonishing Jurors to Disregard What They Haven’t Heard, 25 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 689, 695-96 (1992).
246. See text accompanying supra note 200.
247. See MAY, supra note 40, at 234; see also supra text accompanying note
117.
248. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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Expert testimony should be used primarily when
necessary to explain defects in another witness’s testimonial
capacity. Trials are not social science seminars. Expert
testimony that conflicts with the core testimonial
assumptions should usually be excluded as unhelpfully
confusing and a threat to the legitimacy of trials. When lay
witnesses suffer illnesses or conditions that affect their
ability to perceive, remember, or accurately narrate, expert
testimony is likely needed to understand their impact on
credibility. And even then exposition (lecture) should be the
preferred mode of expert testimony; expert opinions on
another witness’s accuracy are usually of little assistance
and only invite the jury to substitute the expert’s credibility
for that of a lay witness.249
As Wigmore and Hutchins observed a century ago,
modern psychology undoubtedly offers fresh perspective on
human cognition but its insights must be reconciled with
the values and imperatives of trial. Above all, the law of
evidence must better understand the social and cultural
landscape of its own testimonial assumptions—its
“epistemological basis”—before it can fully appreciate where
and how such changes may be introduced, whether in the
form of new doctrine, rules, or innovative testimony,
without sacrificing the legitimacy of the modern trial.250

249. See Faigman, supra note 111, at 310.
250. See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 44; see also supra text accompanying
notes 109-14.

